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Dierent markets are cleared by dierent types of prices|seller-
specic prices that are uniform across buyers in some markets, and
personalized prices tailored to the buyer in others. We examine a set-
ting in which buyers and sellers make investments before matching
in a competitive market. We introduce the notion of premuneration
values|the values to the transacting agents prior to any transfers|
created by a buyer-seller match. Personalized price equilibrium out-
comes are independent of premuneration values and exhibit inecien-
cies only in the event of \coordination failures," while uniform-price
equilibria depend on premuneration values and in general feature in-
ecient investments even without coordination failures. There is thus
a trade-o between the costs of personalizing prices and the inecient
investments under uniform prices. We characterize the premuneration
values under which uniform-price equilibria similarly exhibit inecien-
cies only in the event of coordination failures.
Keywords: Directed search, matching, premuneration value, pre-
match investments, search.
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3Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets
1 Introduction
1.1 Investment and Matching Markets
We analyze a model in which agents match to generate a surplus which they
then split. Prior to matching, the agents make investments that will aect
the size of the surplus.
For example, suppose there is a continuum of workers and a continuum
of rms, each with unit mass. Each worker and rm rst makes a costly
investment in an attribute|rms invest in technology while workers invest in
human capital. In the second stage, workers and rms match and generate
a surplus. In the absence of any monetary transfers, the rm owns the
output produced by the worker, while the worker bears the cost of the eort
exerted in the course of production and owns the value of the skills learned
in the course of production. We call these costs and benets the agents'
premuneration values (from pre plus the Latin munerare, to give or to pay).
Both the surplus and its division between buyer and seller premuneration
values depend on the attributes the agents have chosen. The worker's human
capital may enhance the quality of the output owned by the rm, and the
rm's technology may enhance the value of on-the-job learning to the worker.
The nal division of the surplus between the worker and rm is determined
by the premuneration values and a subsequent monetary transfer.
A large literature examines settings in which agents make investments
before trading in a market. One extreme, discussed by Williamson (1975),
treats the case of a single buyer and seller. The agents' post-investment mar-
ket power then gives rise to a \hold-up" problem that prompts inecient in-
vestments. At the other extreme, Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001) and
Peters and Siow (2002) examine models with competitive post-investment
markets, featuring a continuum of heterogenous buyers and sellers and fric-
tionless trading, showing that equilibria with ecient investments exist.
Our analysis falls between these two. Our post-investment markets again
feature continua of heterogeneous agents, but we introduce a key friction into
the trading process, namely that rms (continuing with our example) cannot
observe workers' attribute choices.1.2 Personalized Pricing
The appropriate equilibrium notion in our setting is not obvious, to a large
extent because we must determine the returns to attributes that nobody
chooses. Continuing with our example, it is helpful to rst consider the
case in which rms can observe workers' investments. We refer to this as
personalized pricing, since wages can be conditioned on the chosen attributes
of both the rm and the worker. In this setting, an equilibrium would be
a specication of the attribute chosen by each rm and worker, a wage
function and a matching of rms and workers such that no agent can increase
his utility by changing his decision and such that markets clear, i.e., the
matching is one-to-one.
This equilibrium notion is similar to Walrasian equilibrium, except that
the wage function attaches a value only to pairs of rm and worker attributes
that are chosen in the investment stage, and not to unchosen attributes. In
the language of Walrasian equilibrium, the price vector includes a price for
every good present in the market, but not for nonexistent goods. We address
the latter with a requirement that no rm (say) can unilaterally deviate to
adopting some currently unchosen attribute and then match with a worker
at her existing attribute, while splitting the surplus in such a way as to make
both better o.
Environments in which people must decide which goods to bring to mar-
ket or which investments to make before entering the market readily give
rise to coordination failures. In the extreme, there is an autarkic equilib-
rium in which neither rms nor workers invest because no one expects the
other side to invest. We could preclude such coordination failures by simply
assuming that prices exist for all attributes, in and out of the market. On
the one hand, we nd the existence of such prices counterintuitive. More
importantly, like Makowski and Ostroy (1995), we expect coordination fail-
ures to be endemic when people must decide what goods to market, and
hence think it important to work with a model that does not preclude them.
Personalized-price equilibria can be shown to exist using a variant of
the existence argument in Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001). There
exist coordination-failure equilibria with inecient investments, but there
also exist exist ecient equilibria in which no worker-rm pair, matched or
unmatched, could be made jointly better o, even if they could commit to
their investments prior to matching. Premuneration values are irrelevant,
in the sense that every personalized price equilibrium outcome remains an
equilibrium outcome irrespective of the allocation of premuneration values.
21.3 Uniform Pricing
We are interested in the case in which rms cannot observe workers' at-
tribute choices. Wages can then depend only on rms' attributes, and we
speak of uniform pricing to emphasize that workers who have chosen dif-
ferent attributes must be oered the same wage. Our equilibrium notion
is a specication of the attribute chosen by each rm and worker, a wage
function, and a choice of rm on the part of each worker, such that no agent
can increase his utility by changing his decision and such that markets clear.
Analogous to personalized price equilibrium, the possibility of coordination
failures again arises.
We show that a uniform-price equilibrium exists. However, these equi-
libria are in general inecient, even if they exhibit no coordination failures.
There exist ecient uniform-price equilibria if, and essentially only if, rms'
premuneration values are independent of workers' attributes. Hence, pre-
muneration values matter for uniform-price equilibria.
While it may be unrealistic to think that workers' attributes are literally
unobservable, ascertaining these attributes may nonetheless be quite costly.
Expanding beyond our worker-rm example, estimates from 11 highly selec-
tive liberal arts colleges indicate that they spent about $3,000 on admissions,
i.e., ascertaining students' attributes, per matriculating student in 2004.1
The cost for identifying whether a foreign high school diploma comes from a
legitimate high school is $100.2 There may thus be substantial savings from
posting uniform prices and letting buyers sort themselves, if the premunera-
tion values are such that uniform prices can do this sorting. Alternatively, if
the premuneration values are such that uniform prices cannot duplicate the
allocation of personalized prices, and if transactions costs or institutional
considerations preclude personalized prices, then market outcomes will be
inecient.
1.4 Premuneration values
The premuneration values of the rms in our motivating example will typ-
ically depend on their employees' attributes|better skilled and more pro-
ductive employees will enhance the quality and quantity of a rm's output.
The business pages are lled with announcements of the good news that a
1Memorandum, Oce of Institutional Research and Analysis, University of Pennsyl-
vania, July 2004. We thank Barnie Lentz for his help with these data.
2\Vetting Those Foreign College Applications," New York Times, September 29, 2004,
page A21.
3rm has hired a particularly prized employee. Moving beyond this example,
students are matched with universities after students have incurred substan-
tial preparation costs and universities have hired faculty. Both sides care
about the investments the other side has made. Universities reap benets
well beyond tuition revenues from talented students, and students clamor
for spots at elite universities. Similarly, an aspiring faculty member cares
about the investments a university has made in facilities and other faculty,
while the university cares about the investment in knowledge and research
capabilities of the potential recruit.
The central message of this paper is that there is a tradeo between the
costs of personalizing pricing and the ineciency of uniform pricing. One
might hope to ameliorate this tradeo by reallocating the premuneration
values. In particular, premuneration values are aected by the explicit and
implicit property rights to the costs and benets that ow from a match. For
example, one could arrange the premuneration values in a university/student
interaction so that the university owns all of the surplus. This would require
a somewhat unconventional arrangement in which the university shares in
the future income of students to whom it gives degrees. However, income-
contingent loans in a number of countries (including Australia, Sweden and
New Zealand) that eectively give the lender a share of students' future
income (Johnstone, 2001) attest to the possibility of such an arrangement.3
There are often, however, constraints on the design of premuneration
values. Moral hazard problems loom especially large. If universities owned
a large share of students' enhanced future income streams, why would the
students exert the eort required to realize this future income? How are we
to measure and collect the increment to income attributable to the university
education? Such an arrangement might also require changes in labor laws
that preclude involuntary servitude. More generally, laws concerning work-
place safety, the (in)ability to surrender legal rights, the division of marital
3In the summer of 2010, the UK debated the possibility of partially fund-
ing higher education though a \graduate tax" levied on college graduates' income
(http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-10649459). Basketball star Yao Ming (Hous-
ton Rockets) has a contract with the China Basketball Association calling for 30%
of his NBA earnings to be paid to the Chinese Basketball Association (in which he
played prior to joining the Rockets), while another 20% will go to the Chinese govern-
ment. Similar arrangements hold for Wang Zhizhi (Dallas Mavericks) and Menk Ba-
teer (Denver Nuggets and San Antonio Spurs). (See the Detroit News, April 26, 2002,
http://www.detnews.com/2002/pistons/0204/27/sports-475199.htm/.) We can view the
initial match between Yao Ming and his Chinese team as producing a surplus that includes
the enhanced value of his earnings as a result of developing his basketball skills, and the
contract as setting premuneration values.
4assets and the custody and sale of children may constrain the allocation of
premuneration values. Our analysis points to the cost of such constraints or
institutional arrangements, in the form of personalization costs or inecient
uniform pricing.
1.5 Related Literature
Our model is related to the literature on competitive search (see Guerrieri,
Shimer, and Wright (2010) for a recent contribution and for pointers to the
literature). We depart from a standard competitive search model in three re-
spects. First, we include a rst stage at which investments are made, whereas
most competitive search models begin with buyers and sellers with exoge-
nously given attributes. Second, we assume that both buyers and sellers
are \totally heterogeneous," in the sense that no two buyers or sellers have
the same cost of acquiring attributes. As a consequence of this heterogene-
ity, our equilibria (under either personalized or uniform pricing) perfectly
separate investing agents|no two buyers who make nontrivial investments
choose the same seller at the matching stage. Third, like Guerrieri, Shimer,
and Wright (2010), we introduce a key friction into the competitive search
model, asymmetric information, in the sense that sellers cannot condition
prices on buyers' characteristics.
Our analysis diers from that of Guerrieri, Shimer, and Wright (2010)
most notably in the nature of the prematching investment choice. In their
model, only sellers make investments, and these consist of paying a xed cost
to participate in the second stage. Sellers who enter the second stage are
homogenous, making it more dicult to screen buyers than in our model.
Premuneration values play no role in their model and coordination failures
cannot arise. The resulting equilibria are inecient, and the ineciencies
arise not at the investment stage but out of constraints on the ability to
screen workers. In contrast, in our model, the continuum of possible in-
vestments available to agents on both sides of the market is the source of
ineciencies, with the existence and nature of ineciency depending upon
the nature of the premuneration values.
Variants of competitive search models have been used to accommodate
sources of friction other than asymmetric information. The most obvious
such friction is to assume that buyers and sellers cannot instantly match. In-
stead, buyers must engage in costly search, including the prospects of being
either temporarily or permanently unable to nd a seller (e.g., Niederle and
Yariv (2008) and Peters (2010)). We forgo including such considerations in
order to focus on one friction at a time, in our case asymmetric information.
5Our focus on creating incentives for ecient investments is shared by a
number of other papers.4 Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) analyze a worker-
rm model in which rms (only) make ex ante investments. If wages are
determined by post-match bargaining, then the resulting eective power
gives rise to a standard hold-up problem inducing rms to underinvest. The
hold-up problem disappears if workers have no bargaining power, but then
there is excess entry on the part of rms. Acemoglu and Shimer show that
ecient outcomes can be achieved if the bargaining process is replaced by
wage posting on the part of rms, followed by competitive search. de Meza
and Lockwood (2009) examine an investment and matching model that gives
rise to excess investment. Their overinvestment possibility rests on a dis-
crete set of investment choices and the presence of bargaining power in a
noncompetitive post-investment stage. In contrast, the competitive post-
investment markets of Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001) and Peters
and Siow (2002) lead to ecient two-sided investments.
Moving from complete-information to incomplete-information matching
models typically gives rise to issues of either screening, as considered here,
or signaling. See Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (1995), Hopkins (forthcom-
ing), Hoppe, Moldovanu, and Sela (2009), and Rege (2008) for models that
incorporate signaling into matching models with investments.
2 The Model
2.1 The Market
There is a unit measure of buyers whose types are indexed by  and dis-
tributed uniformly on [0;1], and a unit measure of sellers whose types are
indexed by  and distributed uniformly on [0;1]. For ease of reference,
buyers are female and sellers male.
Buyers and sellers have an outside option (with payo zero) that pre-
cludes participation in the matching process. If they do not take this option,
they make choices in two stages. First, each buyer simultaneously chooses
an attribute b 2 R+ and each seller simultaneously chooses an attribute
s 2 R+. Second, buyers and sellers match, with each match generating a
surplus to be split between the participating agents.
4Early indications that frictionless, competitive search might create investment incen-
tives appear in Hosios (1990), Moen (1997) and Shi (2001). Eeckhout and Kircher (2010)
provide an extension to asymmetric information, while Masters (2009) examines a model
with two-sided investments.
6Attributes are costly, but enhance the surplus generated in the second
stage. To keep the analysis tractable, we assume that agents' types aect
the rst-stage cost of investment but not the second-stage surplus, which
depends only on the attributes chosen by the agents. In particular, the cost
of attribute b 2 R+ to buyer  is given by cB(b;) and the cost of attribute
s 2 R+ to seller  is given by cS(s;). The total surplus from a match
involving buyer attribute b and seller attribute s is given by v(b;s).
Suppose that a buyer and seller match and create surplus v(b;s), but
(presumably counterfactually) no transfers are made. The surplus is still
divided between the buyer and seller, and it may well be that both receive
some of the surplus. A rm that does not pay its employee may capture
much of the surplus, in the form of the value of the employee's production.
The employee's surplus includes the cost of her eort, but may also include
the value of her enhanced human capital stemming from her association with
the rm. We refer to the portions of the surplus that accrue to the agents
in the absence of transfers as their premuneration values. We let hB(b;s)
denote the premuneration value of the buyer and hS(b;s) the premuneration
value of the seller, with
hB(b;s) + hS(b;s) = v(b;s):
The premuneration values depend on the nature of the interaction be-
tween the two agents and the legal and institutional environment in which
that interaction takes place. For example, the law may stipulate that the
employer owns the output produced by an employee and owns any patents
that emerge from the employees work, but that the employee owns the value
of any contacts she makes while on the job.
The important point is that a match creates a surplus, independent
of transfers. Some of this surplus is owned by the seller and the rest by
the buyer, as specied by the premuneration values. Premuneration values
are thus the counterparts of endowments in standard general equilibrium
models.
Transfers alter the division of the surplus. A match between a buyer and
seller with attribute choices (b;s) at a price p yields a gross (i.e., ignoring
investment costs) buyer payo of
hB(b;s)   p;
and a gross seller payo of
hS(b;s) + p:
7We assume that prices must be uniform, meaning that prices can be
conditioned only on seller attributes. Any buyer who trades with a given
seller does so at the same price, regardless of the buyer's attribute (though
trades involving dierent sellers may occur at dierent prices).
There are several factors that would constrain prices to be uniform.
First, it may be prohibitively expensive for sellers to observe buyers' char-
acteristics. For example, rms may be unable to observe whether their
potential employees have invested in eective work habits. Second, tailor-
ing prices to buyers' attribute choices may entail prohibitive menu costs.
A college may prefer to set uniform prices rather than bear the cost of an
admissions department to carefully vet applicants. Similarly, it may be cost-
less to use generic contract forms to make a standard oer to every buyer
who appears, while tailoring oers to buyers' characteristics requires a costly
legal process. Third, legal restrictions may prescribe uniform pricing. For
example, employers may be prohibited from discriminating against potential
employees whose attributes make them potentially expensive health risks,
or union contracts may prohibit wage discrimination.
In each case, the constraints that give rise to uniform pricing also deter-
mine which of the two parties' attributes prices can be conditioned on. If
buyer attributes are unobservable, then the only possibility is to condition
prices on seller attributes. It will be convenient to consistently call the side
of the market on which prices can be conditioned sellers. Prices may then
be either positive or negative, and the agent we call a seller may in ordinary
parlance be called either a buyer or seller.
2.2 Example: Basic Structure
We introduce here an example that we carry throughout the analysis. The
premuneration values are such that a xed share  2 (0;1] of the surplus
goes to the buyer (Footnote 5 explains why  = 0 is excluded), so that
hB(b;s) = bs and hS(b;s) = (1   )bs;








It is then a straightforward calculation (with details in Appendix A.1)
that the ecient outcome entails attribute-choice functions
b() =  and s() = ;
8and positive assortative matching, so that seller  matches with buyer  = ,




Assumption 1 (Supermodularity) The premuneration values hB : R+







There is a simple class of problems for which this assumption holds
that includes our example: premuneration values constitute xed shares
of the surplus, or hB(b;s) = v(b;s) and hS(b;s) = (1   )v(b;s) for some
 2 (0;1], and the surplus function v : R+R+ ! R is strictly supermodular
(@2v=@b@s > 0), as well as (twice continuously) dierentiable and increasing
in b and s.
Our next assumption is a \no free surplus" requirement that matches
are not protable without investments:
Assumption 2 (Essentiality) The premuneration values hB(b;0) and hB(0;s)
are constant in b and s, respectively, and
hB(0;0) + hS(0;0) = 0:
The following single-crossing condition requires that higher-index buyers
and sellers are more productive, in the sense that they have lower investment
costs:
5The asymmetry in this assumption|it requires a strict inequality on the cross partial
of hB, but only a weak inequality on that of hS|reects our convention that sellers set
prices. If the derivative for buyers is zero, then every buyer will attempt to purchase from
the same seller, destroying all hope of sorting buyers. Peters (2010) illustrates the compli-
cations that arise if buyers' premuneration values do not depend on sellers' characteristics.
However, Section 4.2 shows that there exist ecient uniform-price equilibrium outcomes if
and only if seller premuneration values do not depend on buyer attribute choices, making
it important to include the weak inequality for the seller. As will become clear, this zero
second derivative for the seller poses no diculty. The asymmetry that appears in the
rst part of Assumption 2 similarly arises out of the convention that sellers set prices,
though this part of the Assumption is more technical in nature, allowing us to rule out
some troublesome boundary cases.
9Assumption 3 (Single-crossing) The cost function cB : R+[0;1] ! R+





The cost function cS satises analogous conditions.
Our next assumption ensures that ecient attribute choices exist and
are bounded.
Assumption 4 (Boundedness) There exists  b such that for all b >  b,
s 2 R+,  2 [0;1] and  2 [0;1],
v(b;s)   cB(b;)   cS(s;) < 0:
A similar statement, with an analogous  s, applies to sellers.
3.2 Feasible Outcomes
We next dene feasible matchings between buyers and sellers. We denote
by b : [0;1] ! [0; b] and s : [0;1] ! [0;  s] the Lebesgue-measurable functions
describing the attributes chosen by buyers and sellers.
The closures of the sets of attributes chosen by buyers and sellers re-
spectively are denoted by B  cl(b([0;1])) and S  cl(s([0;1])). We refer to
B and S as the set of marketed attributes. Let B and S be the measures
induced on B and S by the agents' attribute choices: for Borel sets B0  B
and S0  S,
B(B0) = f 2 [0;1] : b() 2 B0g
and S(S0) = f 2 [0;1] : s() 2 S0g;
where  is Lebesgue measure. The measures of buyers and of sellers who
choose the zero attribute are denoted by   supf : b() = 0g and  
supf : s() = 0g.
We simplify the analysis by restricting attention to equilibrium attribute-
choice functions that are strictly increasing when positive (i.e., b() > 0 and
0 >  imply b(0) > b(), and similarly for s) and that assign equal masses
of buyers and sellers to zero attribute choices. We show that equilibria exist
with attribute choice functions satisfying these restrictions. More general
feasible matchings could be dened, but at the cost of considerable technical
complication.
10Denition 1 Suppose b and s are strictly increasing when positive and
that  = . A feasible matching is a pair of measure-preserving functions
~ b : (S;S) ! (B;B) and ~ s : (B;B) ! (S;S) satisfying
~ s(~ b(s)) = s for all s 2 s((;1]); (1)
and ~ b(~ s(b)) = b for all b 2 b((;1]): (2)
Given a feasible matching (~ b; ~ s), ~ b(s) species the buyer attribute matched
to a seller with attribute s, and ~ s(b) species the seller attribute matched
to a buyer with attribute b. Observe that equations (1) and (2) imply that
~ s is one-to-one on b((;1]) and ~ b is one-to-one on s((;1]). The measure-
preserving requirement on ~ b ensures that the measure of any set of sellers is
equal to the measure of the set of buyers with whom they are matched, i.e.,
B(~ b(S0)) = S(S0) for all Borel S0  S (and similarly for ~ s).
We have simplied the analysis by dening the matching functions ~ b and
~ s on the closures S and B of the sets of chosen attributes. In many cases
of interest, ecient attribute-choice functions are discontinuous (see Cole,
Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001, Section 2) for an example of discontinuous
attribute-choice functions with personalized pricing (cf. Section 6.1)). Since
the sets B and S are the closures of the sets of attribute choices, a seller 
(with attribute choice s()) may be matched with a buyer attribute choice
b that is not chosen by any buyer. We interpret such a seller as matching
with a buyer whose attribute choice is arbitrarily close to b, while retain-
ing the convenience of saying that s() matches with b. Dening feasible
matchings on either the agents directly or on the sets of attributes (rather
than their closures) would avoid this interpretation, at the cost of requiring
the equivalent but more complicated formulation used in Cole, Mailath, and
Postlewaite (2001).
Denition 2 A feasible outcome (b;s;~ b; ~ s) is a pair of attribute-choice
functions b and s that are strictly increasing when positive and satisfy  = ,
along with a feasible matching (~ b; ~ s).
3.3 Uniform Pricing
Sellers post prices that depend on their own attribute choices, but not the
attributes of buyers. We describe these prices by a uniform-price function
pU : S ! R.
11Given a feasible outcome (b;s;~ b; ~ s) and a uniform-price function pU the
payos to a buyer  choosing b 2 B and a seller  choosing s 2 S are
B(b;)  hB(b; ~ s(b))   pU(~ s(b))   cB(b;)
and S(s;)  hS(~ b(s);s) + pU(s)   cS(s;):
Under uniform pricing, sellers cannot condition on buyer attributes. Conse-
quently, sellers choose only their own attributes. Buyers, on the other hand,
choose attributes and can choose any marketed seller attribute regardless of
their own attribute choice. These choices should maximize payos. A buyer
 optimizes (at b) given pU if
B(b();) = max
(b;s)2R+S
hB(b;s)   pU(s)   cB(b;): (3)
Similarly, a seller  optimizes (at s) given pU if
S(s();) = max
s2S
hS(~ b(s);s) + pU(s)   cS(s;): (4)
3.4 Equilibrium
The uniform-price function pU determines the payo to a buyer for any
attribute he chooses and any seller he matches with, since prices do not de-
pend on the buyers' attribute choices. It also determines the payo to any
seller who chooses a marketed attribute (i.e., s 2 S), but not for nonmar-
keted attributes, since such attributes are not priced by the function pU. We
think of a seller who chooses a nonmarketed attribute as naming the price
at which he is willing to trade, and then trading with one of the buyers
willing to trade at this price, if there are any. However, this attribute and
price combination potentially attracts many buyer attributes, all of which
are indistinguishable to the seller. The following denition requires that the
seller's deviation to (s0;p) with s0 62 S be protable irrespective of the buyer
attracted.6
Denition 3 Given (b;s;~ b; ~ s;pU), there is a protable seller deviation if
there exists  such that either (i) S(s();) < 0 or (ii) there exists an
unmarketed attribute choice s0 62 S, a price p 2 R, and at least one buyer
b0 2 B such that
6We could extend Denition 3 to cover deviations to any seller attribute (rather than
simply unmarketed seller attributes), as well as deviations to other prices at the seller's
current attribute. Appendix B shows that if buyers optimize given pU and sellers have no
protable deviations in this extended sense, then sellers must also be optimizing given pU.
12hB(b0;s0)   p > hB(b0; ~ s(b0))   pU(~ s(b0)); (5)
and for any such b0,
hS(b0;s0) + p   cS(s0;) > S(s();):
If S(s();) < 0, the outside option is better for the seller than the
prescribed choice. This part of the denition plays only a technical role in
the analysis, ensuring that we are not inappropriately forcing our agents to
participate in the market. We will make greater use of the second require-
ment, that a protable seller deviation arises if there is some seller who can
choose an unmarketed attribute and set a price that attracts some buyers,
and then earn a higher payo from any attracted buyer than in the putative
equilibrium.
Remark 1 (Protable Deviations) A seller is dened to have a prof-
itable deviation under uniform pricing only if he is better o when matched
with any buyer who is attracted to the deviation. Why make sellers so pes-
simistic? One could alternatively think of requiring only that the seller be
better o given a random draw from the set of attracted buyers. Though
the details of the calculations (and the existence proof) would dier consid-
erably, the qualitative forces behind our results would remain. In particular,
the essence of uniform pricing is that the seller cannot stipulate which buy-
ers he is willing to trade with and which he is not. This inability aects the
seller most starkly when we assume the seller draws the worst buyer from
the set of willing buyers, but the eects remain as long as the seller cannot
select the best buyer.
Adopting the pessimistic formulation that seller deviations must be prof-
itable when matched with the worst willing buyer makes seller deviations
less attractive and hence enlarges the set of uniform-price equilibria. Our
key results (Propositions 1 and 2), establishing conditions under which there
exist ecient uniform price equilibria, are rendered more powerful by such
a permissive denition of equilibrium. 
Denition 4 A feasible outcome (b;s;~ b; ~ s) and a uniform-price function
pU : S ! R constitute a uniform-price equilibrium if all agents optimize
given pU and the seller has no protable deviations.
13Remark 2 The denition of a uniform-price equilibrium is reminiscent of
that of a subgame-perfect equilibrium of a game, but with many of the details
of the game left unspecied. In particular, given a candidate equilibrium, the
deviations in the agents' choices (attribute choices and matching) that would
preclude this outcome and price from being an equilibrium are identied
without specifying the precise result of the deviations. For example, suppose
that given an outcome (b;s;~ b; ~ s), buyer  could get a higher payo by
deviating and choosing seller attribute s0 rather than the prescribed seller
attribute ~ s(b()). This would result in there being two buyers matched with
seller s0, and if we were to model this as a well-dened game we would have
to specify which buyer ends up matched with the seller. One could provide
such specicity, but doing so gives rise to a number of arbitrary choices
and technical issues that obscure the underlying economics. Analogous to
the denition of Walrasian equilibrium, we simply say that an outcome and
price is an equilibrium when no such deviations exist. 
Remark 3 (Complete Pricing) By altering Denition 4 to require pU to
have domain [0;s], thereby setting a price for every seller attribute (whether
marketed or not), and expanding to [0;  s] the set of seller attribute choices
over which the buyer optimizes, we obtain a complete uniform-price equi-
librium. Notice, however, that the matching function is still restricted to
marketed attributes, and hence the seller's payo when choosing an unmar-
keted attribute is still separately dened as in Denition 3. 
Remark 4 (Hedonic Pricing) In a uniform-price equilibrium, each buyer
faces prices over seller attributes, and so it is tempting to interpret the
prices as hedonic prices. However, since sellers care about buyer attributes
and the prices are not a function of these attributes, all payo-relevant
characteristics are not priced.7 Accordingly, a uniform-price equilibrium is
not an equilibrium in hedonic prices. 
3.5 Example: A Uniform-Price Equilibrium
Under uniform pricing, buyer  faces a uniform-price schedule pU and chooses
a buyer attribute b and a seller attribute s 2 S to solve
max
b;s




7Of course, in equilibrium, each seller can infer the buyer attribute that is matched
with each marketed attribute at the equilibrium price.
14When choosing an attribute s, the seller is selected by a buyer with attribute
b = ~ b(s) and receives prices pU. The seller  thus solves
max
s




The uniform-price equilibrium is given by the following collection (the deriva-

























When  = 1, this uniform-price equilibrium gives the ecient outcome
calculated in Section 2.2. In this case, the restriction to uniform pricing
imposes no eciency costs, and giving sellers the ability to condition prices
on buyer attributes would have no eect on behavior or payos. Conversely,
when  < 1, the uniform-price equilibrium is inecient, in that the gener-
ated surplus of almost all matched pairs is not maximized. We discuss this
ineciency further in Section 4.3.
Note that the equilibrium is not unique. In particular, all buyers and
sellers choosing the zero attribute is also an equilibrium outcome.
4 Eciency
When are uniform-price equilibrium outcomes ecient? Eciency fails (i.e.,
total surplus is not maximized) when either the wrong agents are matched
or the wrong attributes agents are chosen by matched.
4.1 Ecient Matching
Eciency requires that the second-stage matching be positively assortative
in attributes. The supermodularity assumptions on premuneration values
guarantee this positive assortativity in equilibrium.
Lemma 1 In any uniform-price equilibrium (b;s;~ b; ~ s;pU), ~ b and ~ s are strictly
increasing for strictly positive attributes, and so the matching is positively
assortative in attributes.
15Proof. Suppose ~ b is not strictly increasing. Since ~ b is one-to-one on s((;1])
(see Denition 1 and its following comment), there exists 0 < s1 < s2 with
b1  ~ b(s1) > ~ b(s2)  b2. Adding
hB(b1;s1)   pU(s1)  hB(b1;s2)   pU(s2)
and
hB(b2;s2)   pU(s2)  hB(b2;s1)   pU(s1)
gives
hB(b1;s1) + hB(b2;s2)  hB(b1;s2) + hB(b2;s1);
contradicting the strict supermodularity of hB.
Equation (2) then implies that ~ s is strictly increasing.
4.2 Ecient Investments






W(b;s;)  v(b;s)   cB(b;)   cS(s;):
This eciency is not guaranteed. We begin with some intuition, ap-
propriate when equilibrium is characterized by rst-order conditions. Fix a
uniform-price equilibrium. By standard incentive compatibility arguments,
the uniform-price function is dierentiable. The rst-order conditions im-
plied for the buyer's choice of attribute b and matching attribute choice s
































16Using (11) to eliminate dpU(s)=ds in (12) and then using the identity v(b;s) =























Eciency requires than any matched buyer and seller maximize the dier-
ence between the surplus they generate and their investment costs, giving















Comparing these, it is immediate that the solution to the rst-order condi-
tions for an ecient allocation will be a solution for the rst-order conditions
for the uniform-price equilibrium if dhS(b;s)=db = 0, that is, if each seller's
premuneration value is independent of the attribute choice of the buyer
with whom the seller is matched. Moreover, the same argument shows that
when seller premuneration values are independent of buyer attributes, every
uniform-price equilibrium is constrained ecient, in that no eciency gains
can be achieved without a simultaneous deviation to unmarketed buyer and
seller attributes. In other words, ineciency arises only out of coordination
failure.
These arguments are summarized in the following proposition. The proof
follows the preceding intuition (though it requires no dierentiability as-
sumptions), and so is relegated to Appendix C.
Proposition 1 Suppose the sellers' premuneration values do not depend
on the buyer's attribute. There exist ecient uniform-price equilibria. In










17The constancy of hS(b;s) in b is also essentially necessary for personalized-
price equilibria to be achieved via uniform pricing. The \essentially" here
is that this constancy need not hold for pairs (b;s) that are not matched in
equilibrium.8
Proposition 2 Suppose the ecient outcome (b;s;~ b; ~ s) can be supported as




Proof. It follows from (10) and (13) (again, without any dierentiability
assumptions beyond those placed on the primitives of the model in Assump-
tions 1 and 3), that if (b;s;~ b; ~ s;pP) is and ecient outcome that can be







implying dhS(~ b(s);s)=db = 0.
4.3 Example: Eciency
Suppose rst that sellers own none of the surplus (i.e.,  = 1, and hence
hS(b;s) = 0 and dhS(b;s)=db = 0). In this case, the uniform-price equilib-
rium of Section 3.5 results in an ecient outcome. Consequently, no seller
would gain by personalizing his price even if he could and the ability to
personalize prices is irrelevant.
In the ecient outcome, the buyer's equilibrium attribute choice is b() =
. Buyer attributes in the uniform-price equilibria are again a linear func-
tion of the buyer's index, with slope 2=3(2 )1=3. This slope is below 1 for
all  < 1, that is, buyers' investments are ineciently low. The inability to
personalize prices prevents sellers from oering buyers lower prices in return
for higher buyer attributes. As a result, the return on buyers' investments
under uniform pricing is less than the social return, and buyers choose lower
attributes than would be ecient.
The magnitude of the ineciency decreases as  increases. The smaller
the buyers' premuneration values, the larger the extent to which their at-
tribute choices fall short of ecient levels.
8Analogously, the single-crossing condition is essentially necessary for a separating
equilibrium in a signaling model.







Figure 1: Uniform-price equilibrium attribute choices as a function of , the
buyers' premuneration-value share of the surplus. The lower curved line is
the coecient of the (linear) buyer attribute-choice function, while the upper
curved line is that of the seller attribute-choice function. Both coecients
are 1 in the ecient outcome.
Sellers' attribute choices in the uniform-price equilibrium are similarly
a linear function of index, with slope 1=3(2   )2=3. Since this exceeds the
buyer coecient, buyers choose smaller attributes than sellers, with buyers
of attribute choice level b matching with values s > b.
Perhaps surprisingly, the sellers' investment behavior is not monotonic
in , as illustrated in Figure 1. For low levels of |when the sellers' share
of the surplus is near 1|sellers invest very little. This is to be expected
since the value of their investment depends on buyers' investment, which is
low in this case. The slope of the seller attribute-choice function initially
increases in , a consequence of the increase in buyers' attribute choices and
the increase in the price a seller attribute fetches. When  t :38, sellers
make precisely the attribute choices under uniform pricing that they would
in the ecient outcome. The equilibrium is still inecient, however, as
buyers invest too little. For larger values of , uniform pricing leads sellers
to invest more than they do in the ecient outcome.
To understand this seller behavior, notice that a seller would like to
19screen the buyers to whom he sells, but the inability to personalize prices pre-
cludes doing so directly. The key to screening buyers is that high-attribute
buyers have a higher willingness to pay for high-attribute sellers than do
low-attribute buyers. Sellers then have an incentive to choose higher at-
tributes (than the ecient level) and charge higher prices. As  increases,
buyer attribute choices increase, making screening all the more valuable to
sellers. As a result, seller attribute choices continue to increase above their
ecient levels as  increases above :38.
Once  reaches 2/3, sellers' attribute choices no longer increase (though
seller attribute choices remain above ecient levels). Buyers' attribute
choices continue to increase as  increases, but the decreasing share that
sellers receive makes screening less valuable, and hence investment less at-
tractive.
Sellers' incentives to screen buyers lead not only to attribute choices
that exceed the ecient investments, but also to attribute choices that are
ineciently high given the buyers' (ineciently low) attribute choices, for
all  < 1. In equilibrium seller  is matched with buyer  = , who makes
attribute choice 2=3(2   )1=3. The net surplus (ignoring the cost of b)
from a match of seller  with such a buyer is




The seller attribute maximizing this surplus is
s() = 1=3(2   )1=6;
which is smaller than the seller's equilibrium attribute choice of 1=3(2  
)1=3.
5 Existence of Equilibrium
Appendix D establishes the existence of uniform-price equilibria, by showing
the existence of complete uniform-price equilibria (see Remark 3).
Proposition 3 If there exists (b;s) 2 (0; b]  (0;  s] with
hB(b;s) + hS(0;s)   cB(b;1)   cS(s;1) > 0; (14)
then there exists a complete uniform-price equilibrium in which some buyers
and some sellers make strictly positive attribute choices.
20Moreover, if for all  2 (0;1], there exists (b;s) 2 (0; b]  (0;  s]
hB(b;s) + hS(0;s)   cB(b;)   cS(s;) > 0; (15)
then there exists a complete uniform-price equilibrium with b();s() > 0
for ; 2 (0;1].
In general, condition (14) is stronger than the requirement that there be
a positive surplus for the most ecient match (though (14) is implied by
that requirement if hS(b;s) is independent of b, the condition of Proposition
1). Uniform-pricing equilibria are inecient when hS(b;s) depends on b,
and if this dependence is too extreme, (14) may fail and there may be no
investment on either side.
Two signicant complications must be confronted in the proof of ex-
istence of uniform-price equilibria: Equilibrium attribute-choice functions
may be discontinuous, and we must preclude protable deviations to at-
tributes not in the market. These complications preclude the direct ap-
plication of a xed point theorem. We proceed indirectly, constructing a
simultaneous-move three-player game whose equilibria capture the relevant
behavior of uniform-price equilibria. The players include a buyer, whose
payo corresponds to the total buyer payo in our model, a seller whose
payo is analogous but who does not set prices, and a price-setter who is
penalized for market imbalance. In constructing this game, we dene seller
payos in a manner incorporating the pessimism inherent in our denition
of uniform-price equilibrium. Glicksberg's xed point theorem establishes
the existence of Nash equilibria in the three-player game when strategies are
constrained to be Lipschitz continuous. We then examine the limit as this
constraint is removed, showing that the result corresponds to a uniform-price
equilibrium of the underlying economy.
6 Discussion
6.1 Comparison with Personalized Pricing
6.1.1 Personalized Price Equilibrium
The obvious point of comparison for a uniform price equilibrium is with
a scenario in which prices can be conditioned on both buyer and seller
characteristics. In such a scenario, there is a personalized-price function
pP : B  S ! R, where pP(b;s) is the (possibly negative) price that a seller
with attribute choice s 2 S receives when selling to a buyer with attribute
21choice b 2 B. This gives rise to a personalized price equilibrium, analogous
to that of a uniform price equilibrium except that sellers can charge dierent
prices to dierent buyers, and the possibility of a protable deviation to an
unmarketed attribute is now open to buyers as well as sellers. Appendix E
develops the details, establishing the following results.
 Personalized price equilibria exist, and are, modulo some technical
dierences in the specication, equivalent to the ex post contracting
equilibria of Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001).
 Personalized price equilibria are constrained ecient, in the sense that
there is no alternative, Pareto superior allocation that restricts buyers
and sellers to choosing attributes marketed in the equilibrium. Person-
alized price equilibria may exhibit \coordination failure" ineciencies,
in which mutual gains could be realized if buyers and sellers both bring
currently unmarketed attributes to the market. There exists an e-
cient personalized-price equilibrium.
 Premuneration values are irrelevant for personalized-price equilibria.
For a given specication of premuneration values and attendant per-
sonalized price equilibrium, any other specication of premuneration
values admits a personalized-price equilibrium whose outcome, includ-
ing investments, matching function, and payos, duplicate that of the
original equilibrium.
 Under the conditions of Proposition 1, uniform and personalized price
equilibria coincide. In this case, the ability to personalize prices is
irrelevant. Personalization brings sellers no advantage, and even the
slightest cost of personalization would suce to ensure that we see
uniform pricing.
The essence of our results, culminating in Propositions 1 and 2, is to
establish conditions under which personalization is redundant. If these con-
ditions hold, uniform prices also lead to ecient equilibrium outcomes. If
not, uniform prices are inextricably linked to inecient investments. Under
uniform pricing, premuneration values matter.
6.1.2 Example: Personalized Pricing
Returning to our example, suppose that sellers observe buyers' attribute
choices and so can personalize their prices. If buyers and sellers optimize




  (1   )bs; (16)
the result is a feasible and ecient outcome.9 In particular, given the pricing
function (16), buyer  chooses the attribute b = b() =  and chooses to
match with seller attribute s = b(). The seller chooses attribute s = s() =
. The resulting matching of buyers and sellers clears the seller attribute
market (in that the distributions of demanded and supplied seller attributes
agree) and the resulting outcome is ecient. Appendix A.3 contains the
details and conrms that this is a personalized-price equilibrium.
If  < 1 in our example, then all buyers receive lower payos under
uniform than under personalized prices.10 A natural conjecture is that sellers
are necessarily disadvantaged by the inability to personalize prices. The
seller's equilibrium payo in the uniform-price equilibrium is given by







When  = 1, this duplicates the payo from the personalized-price equilib-
rium. For  for which sellers' attributes exceed the personalized-price equi-
librium level, every seller actually earns a higher payo under the uniform-
price equilibrium. This higher payo results from the higher prices that
buyers are willing to pay for the higher attributes chosen by sellers when
they cannot personalize prices.
Why don't we see such higher prices under personalized pricing? Sup-
pose that given a uniform-price equilibrium, a single seller had the ability to
personalize prices. Such a seller could protably reduce his attribute choice
and the price at which he trades, using personalization to exclude the un-
desirable buyers that render such a deviation unprotable under uniform
pricing.
6.1.3 Which Prices are Personalized?
Personalizing prices requires a seller to set a price for every buyer attribute
in the market. However, personalized-price outcomes can be achieved with
9Note that for any seller attribute s, the price that a seller would receive in a match
with a buyer with attribute b is decreasing in b|higher values of b are more valuable, and
hence sellers are willing to charge less for them.







2, falls short of the buyer's payo in the personalized-price equilibrium.
23much simpler pricing schemes. The apparent absence of complicated pricing
schemes thus need not signal the absence of personalized pricing.
The critical feature of personalized pricing is the seller's ability to exclude
buyers with attribute choices lower than the seller's equilibrium match. In
particular, by charging a suciently high price to specic buyer attribute
choices, a seller can ensure that buyers with those attributes will chose not
to buy. We denote this suciently high price by P. A personalized-price
function pP is a uniform-rationing price if it has the form
pP(b;s) =
(
pUR(s); 8b  ~ b(s);
P; otherwise;
for some pUR : S ! R+ and ~ b : S ! B. Under uniform-rationing pricing, a
seller with attribute choice s sets a uniform price p(s) = pUR(s), but then
excludes any buyers with b < by(s).
Appendix E.4 provides the straightforward argument that any personalized-
price equilibrium outcome can be supported by a uniform-rationing price.
Hence, personalized pricing may be ubiquitous without one observing com-
plete menus of prices. Whenever we observe sellers rejecting some buyers|
colleges denying some applicants, or rms rejecting some workers as unqualied|
we are observing forms of personalized pricing.11
6.2 Information
Suppose sellers are constrained to set uniform prices because buyers' at-
tributes are not observable, but that buyers can certify these attributes,
perhaps by taking exams or completing internships that demonstrate their
skills. One might suspect that if the cost to buyers of certifying their at-
tribute is not too high, the uncertainty might \unravel": high-attribute buy-
ers would reveal themselves, making it optimal for the highest-attribute buy-
ers in the remaining pool to reveal themselves, and so on until all buyers'
attributes are known.12 In addition, it seems that this cascading informa-
tion revelation must make at least lower-ranked buyers worse o, if not
all buyers. Indeed, to avoid such unraveling, Harvard Business School stu-
dents have successfully lobbied for policies that prohibit students' divulging
11Peters (2010) examines a model in which personalized prices are achieved via uniform
rationing.
12See Grossman (1981), Milgrom (1981), or Okuno-Fujiwara, Postlewaite, and Suzu-
mura (1990) for analyses of such unraveling.
24their grades to potential employers, while the Wharton student government
adopted a policy banning the release of grades.13
In contrast, in our example, all buyers may be worse o when infor-
mation about their attributes is suppressed than when it is known. This
result holds no matter what (nonzero) share the buyers own of the surplus,
and holds for all buyers. It is the distorted incentives to invest that ensure
even the lowest attribute buyers would be made worse o if buyer-attribute
information were suppressed.
6.3 Who Should Set Prices?
Suppose we could design the informational or legal context so that one side
of the market can set prices, but cannot observe the characteristics on the
other side of the market. Which should we choose? We return to our
example. When  = 0, so the seller owns all of the surplus, the equilibrium
collapses into the trivial equilibrium in which no surplus is generated. In
this case, a buyer's payo is solely the price pU, which will have to be
negative in order to bring buyers into the market, and buyers will choose
the seller posting the smallest (\largest negative") price. Because sellers
cannot condition prices on buyer attribute choice, every buyer will choose
b = 0 in equilibrium. Similarly, when  is positive but small, the equilibrium
is markedly inecient, featuring tiny attribute choices. This is an indication
that the \wrong" side of the market is setting prices, that is, the side setting
prices owns little of the surplus. Suppose personalization by a price setter
is precluded for some reason other than informational asymmetries (such as
legal restrictions or transaction costs), but that an alternative market design
would allow buyers to post uniform prices (i.e., prices that only depend on
buyer attributes). While it is more ecient for sellers to be the price setters
for  > 1
2, it would be more ecient to have buyers post prices when  < 1
2.
6.4 Overinvestment or Underinvestment?
The ineciencies arising in hold-up problems are well understood. The
ineciencies that arise under uniform pricing are qualitatively dierent, as
is easily seen from the overinvestment by sellers in our example for some
values of . The ineciencies in uniform price equilibria in our model stem
from sellers' use of attribute choice as an instrument to screen buyers, in
addition to price, and the response of buyers.
13Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2010) investigate the optimal amount of information to dis-
close from the students' perspective.
25It is unclear whether these ineciencies lead in general to over- or under-
investment. To provide insight into the nature of the forces involved, it
is useful to analyze why the outcome of a personalized-price equilibrium
(bP;sP;~ bP; ~ sP;pP) is not a uniform-price equilibrium outcome. Consider
the outcome (bPsP;~ bP; ~ sP) with uniform price pU(s) = pP(~ b(s);s). With
this uniform price, buyers who previously matched with low attribute sellers
nd sellers with higher attributes more attractive, since the uniform price
does not penalize low attribute buyers. This suggests that in a uniform-
price equilibrium, a seller could discourage low attribute buyers by raising
his price, and to avoid losing the high attribute buyers, also raising his
attribute. The supermodularity in premuneration values ensures that it is
possible to screen buyers in this way.
However, simply altering the seller attributes and pU is not sucient in
general to obtain a uniform price equilibrium. There are two distinct issues.
First, in a personalized-price equilibrium, from the envelope theorem, the










evaluated at s = ~ s(b). In contrast, in a uniform-price equilibrium, the
second term (@pP=@b) is absent. Second, the seller attributes (and prices)
are dierent than in the personalized-price equilibrium. It is a priori unclear
which eect will dominate. In our running example, the buyers underinvest,
and for  not too small, the sellers overinvest.
Characterizing the nature of the investment ineciencies in uniform-
price equilibria will necessarily depend on the specics of the premuneration
values and the attribute cost functions. Similarly, little can be said about
whether it would be more ecient for one side or the other to set prices at
a general level; in particular, it will not be a function only of the premuner-
ation values of the two sides.
6.5 Premuneration Values
Our main result is that under uniform pricing, the decomposition of the total
surplus of a match into the buyer and seller premuneration values aects the
eciency of prematch investments. Appropriately specied premuneration
values can allow us to avoid either the cost (or impossibility) of personalizing
prices or the ineciencies of uniform pricing.
Premuneration values can sometimes be rearranged by appropriate legal
and institutional innovations. The match of researchers and universities gen-
26erates a surplus that includes the value of marketable patents from faculty
research. Historically, universities have owned these patents, but another
institutional arrangement could grant them to the faculty. The feasibility
of such ownership is reected in the decisions of many universities to unilat-
erally grant professors shares in the revenues from patents stemming from
their research. Why aren't all premuneration values specied so as to allow
ecient uniform-pricing outcomes?
Section 1.4 highlighted moral hazard problems. Monitoring consider-
ations may also play a role. Consider a collection of heterogeneous and
risk averse agents who are to be matched with risk neutral principals. One
could ensure that the principal's premuneration values are independent of
agent characteristics by assigning ownership of the technology to the agents.
Uniform pricing per se would then impose no costs, but the agents would
ineciently bear all of the risk associated with the match, leading to ine-
cient actions and less valuable matches. We could instead let the principal
own some or all of the technology, but now the principal's premuneration
value will no longer be independent of the characteristics of the agent with
whom he is matched.14 Finally, legal restrictions may be at work.15
Putting these considerations together, new monitoring and contracting
technologies may be valuable, not only because they can create better in-
centives within a match, but also because they can create more leeway for
designing premuneration values and hence better matching.
14Even before the incentive-design stage, simply measuring and contracting on the rel-
evant variables may pose diculties. The University of New Mexico sued a former re-
searcher for rights to patents that he applied for four years after he had left the university,
arguing that the patents stemmed from research that he had done before leaving. (\Uni-
versities Try to Keep Inventions From Going `Out the Back Door,' " Chronicle of Higher
Education, May 17, 2002.) In principle, the owner of the rights to a song is entitled to a
payment each time the song is played on the radio in a bar or health club, but collection
is impractical.
15For example, Bulow and Levin (2006) note that the National Residency Matching
Program matching medical residents and hospitals constrains hospitals to make the same
oers to all residents. They argue that the primary eect is not inecient matching
but a transfer of surplus to the hospitals (with Niederle and Roth (2003, 2005) oering
an alternative view). However, Nicholson (2003) argues that the result is an inecient
allocation of residents to specialties. Medical students who do their residency acquire
training that dramatically increases their future earnings. Nicholson argues that this
part of the surplus from the match (which is owned by the student) is so large in some
specialties (such as dermatology, general surgery, orthopedic surgery and radiology) that
if personalized prices were employed, medical students would pay hospitals handsomely
for the opportunity to do their residency in these specialities. This is as compared to their
stipend, which was $44,700 in 2007/8 (Association of American Medical College Survey
of Household Stipends, Benets and Funding, Autumn 2007 Report).
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A Example, Detailed Calculations
A.1 Eciency



















Eciency also requires positive assortative matching in attribute (and so
in index, since the cost functions guarantee that attribute choices will be
increasing in index). We can accordingly solve by setting  = , which in
turn implies s = b, giving the ecient attribute-choice functions
b() =  and s() = :
A.2 Derivation of (6){(9)
The buyer chooses an attribute b and a seller attribute s with whom to
match in order to solve
max
b;s









and b   p0
U(s) = 0:
When choosing an attribute s, the seller is selected by a buyer with attribute
b = ~ b(s). The seller  thus solves
max




implying (assuming ~ b is dierentiable) the rst-order condition





Begin by conjecturing that the equilibrium attribute-choice functions are
given by the linear functions
b() = A (A.1)
and s() = B: (A.2)
Then, assuming that in equilibrium, a buyer of type  matches with seller
of type  = , we have ~ b(s) = As=B. Using this, rewrite the buyer's second
rst-order condition as As=B   p0





The requirement that low index traders be willing to participate in the
market implies that the constant of integration equals 0. Similarly, rewrite






Turning to the seller, write the rst-order condition as 2(1   )As=B +














3. It is straightforward to verify that the second order
conditions are satised, and so the conjecture is veried.
A.3 Personalized Prices
Suppose that sellers observe buyers' attribute choices and so can personalize




  (1   )bs: (A.5)Appendix 3
Given the pricing function (A.5), buyer  chooses a buyer attribute b and



















Hence, buyer  chooses the attribute b = b() =  and chooses to match
with seller attribute s = b(). The implied distribution of demanded seller
attributes is uniform on [0;1].
When choosing an attribute s, the seller is selected by a buyer with
attribute b = ~ b(s) = s. The seller  thus solves
max
s
(1   )~ b(s)s +
s2
2











yielding the attribute choice s = s() = . The implied distribution of
supplied seller attributes is uniform on [0;1].
The resulting matching of buyers and sellers clears the seller attribute
market (in that the distributions of demanded and supplied seller attributes
agree). We thus have a personalized-price equilibrium.
































B The Absence of Protable Deviations and Op-
timization given pU
Say that a seller has an extended protable deviation if either he has a
protable seller deviation in the sense of Denition 3, or there exists an
attribute s 2 S for which property (ii) of Denition 3 holds. Note that this
includes the possibility of charging a dierent price for s().
Lemma B.1 Fix a feasible outcome (b;s;~ b; ~ s) and a uniform price pU. Sup-
pose all buyers optimize at b given pU (i.e., (3) holds). If seller  has no
extended protable deviation, then he is optimizing at s given pU.
Proof. Suppose there exists a seller  and attribute choice s0 2 S such that
S(s();) < S(s0;) = hS(~ b(s0);s0) + pU(s0)   cS(s0;):Appendix 4
Let " = [S(s0;)   S(s();)]=4 > 0. Then, there exists  > 0 such that
for all b  ~ b(s0)   ,
hS(b;s0) + pU(s0)   cS(s0;) > S(s();) + 3": (B.1)
Denote by p00 the price for an attribute s00 that makes the buyer with at-
tribute ~ b(s0) indierent between s0 (her equilibrium match) and s00, i.e.,
hB(~ b(s0);s00)   p00 = hB(~ b(s0);s0)   pU(s0):
Choose s00 > s0 suciently close to s0 so that

hS(b;s00)   cS(s00;)   hS(b;s0) + cS(s0;)

 < "; 8b 2 B; (B.2)
holds and jp00   pU(s0)j < "=2. From Assumption 1 (Supermodularity),
hB(~ b(s0)   ;s00)   p00 < hB(~ b(s0)   ;s0)   pU(s0):
For ^ p < p00 suciently close to p00, we have p00   ^ p > "=2 and
hB(~ b(s0)   ;s00)   ^ p < hB(~ b(s0)   ;s0)   pU(s0):
Moreover the buyer with attribute ~ b(s0) receives strictly higher payo from
(s00; ^ p) than from (s0;pU(s0))). Another application of Assumption 1 shows
that for all b  ~ b(s0)   ,
hB(b;s00)   ^ p < hB(b;s0)   pU(s0):
From (3), for all b 2 B,
hB(b;s0)   pU(s0)  hB(b; ~ s(b))   pU(~ s(b));
and so no buyer with attribute b  ~ b(s0)    nds (s00; ^ p) attractive. Thus,
the pair (s00; ^ p) is a protable deviation for seller , since
hS(~ b(s0)   ;s00) + ^ p   cS(s00;) >hS(~ b(s0)   ;s0) + ^ p   cS(s0;)   "
S(s();) + 3" + (^ p   p00) + (p00   pU(s0))   "
=S(s();) + ";
where the rst inequality follows from (B.2) and the second from (B.1).Appendix 5
C Proof of Proposition 1: Ecient Uniform Pric-
ing
Let (b;s;~ b; ~ s;pP) be an ecient personalized-price equilibrium (see Section
E; existence is established in Proposition E.1). We rst show that the price
function can be altered so that the seller is indierent over buyer attributes.
In particular, (b;s;~ b; ~ s; ^ pP) is a personalized-price equilibrium, where ^ pP is
the personalized-price function given by
^ pP(b;s) = pP(~ b(s);s) + hS(~ b(s);s)   hS(b;s); 8(b;s) 2 B  S: (C.1)
Moreover, under ^ pP, the seller is indierent over all marketed buyer at-
tributes.
To verify this, note that seller indierence is immediate, and it is then
immediate that the seller is optimizing given ^ pP. We then need show only
that the buyer is optimizing given pU. Suppose (E.1) fails at some . Then,
for some (b;s) 2 B  S and for suciently small " > 0,
hB(b;s)   (^ pP(b;s) + ")   cB(s;) > B(b();):
Since no buyer has a protable out-of-market deviation,
hS(~ b(s);s) + ^ pP(~ b(s);s)  hS(b;s) + ^ pP(b;s) + ":
But this, with (C.1), yields a contradiction.
We now notice that if hS(b;s) does not depend on b, then neither does
^ pP, implying that (b;s;~ b; ~ s;pU) for pU(s) = ^ pP(;s) is a uniform-price equi-
librium.
The constrained eciency of uniform-price equilibria when the seller
premuneration values do not depend on buyer attributes follows from the
observation that such equilibria are also personalized price equilibria and
Lemma E.2.
D Proof of Proposition 3: Existence of Equilib-
rium.
The existence proof is involved and indirect. We would like to construct
a game   whose equilibria induce uniform-price equilibria. However, the
obvious such game   is itself dicult to handle, so we work with an approx-
imating sequence of games  n. We verify that each  n has an equilibrium,Appendix 6
take limits, and show that the limiting strategy prole induces a uniform-
price equilibrium. Loosely, the n index allows us to accommodate (in the
limit) the possibility of jumps in the attribute-choice functions (precluded
in game  n).
D.1 Preliminaries
Let P = maxfhB( b;  s);hS( b;  s)g. Then P is suciently large that no buyer
would be willing to purchase any seller attribute choice s 2 [0;  s] at a price
exceeding P, nor would any seller be willing to sell to a buyer b 2 [0; b] at
price less than  P. We can thus limit prices to the interval [ P;P].
Since buyer premuneration values are C2, there is a Lipschitz constant
 such that for all " > 0, s 2 [0;  s "], and b 2 [0; b], we have hB(b;s+") 
hB(b;s) < ". As a result, given a choice between seller s and seller s+" at
a price higher by ", buyers would always choose the former. Equilibrium
prices will thus never need to increase at a rate faster than .
D.2 The game  n
Each game  n has three players, consisting of a buyer, a seller, and a price-
setter.
D.2.1 Strategy spaces
We begin by dening the strategy spaces for  n.
The buyer chooses a pair of functions, (b;sB), where b : [0;1] ! [0; b]
species a buyer attribute choice and sB : [0;1] ! [0;  s] a seller attribute
with which to match, each as a function of the buyer's type. We denote
the set of pairs of increasing functions (b;sB) normed by the sum of the L1
norms on the component functions by B. In  n, the buyer is restricted to
the subset of B, denoted by n
B, of functions satisfying (D.1) and (D.2):
(0   )=n  b(0)   b()  n(0   ); 8 < 0 2 [0;1]; (D.1)
and
(0   )=n  sB(0)   sB()  n(0   ); 8 < 0 2 [0;1]: (D.2)
The seller chooses an increasing function s, where s : [0;1] ! [0;  s]
species a seller attribute choice as a function of seller's type. We denote
the set of increasing functions s endowed with the L1 norm by S. In  n,Appendix 7
the seller is restricted to the subset of S, denoted by n
S, of functions
satisfying (D.3),
(0   )=n  s(0)   s()  n(0   ); 8 < 0 2 [0;1]: (D.3)
The price-setter chooses an increasing function pU : [0;  s] ! [ P;P]
satisfying
pU(s0)   pU(s) < 2(s0   s) (D.4)
for all s < s0 2 [0;  s]. Denote the set of increasing functions pU satisfying
(D.4), endowed with the sup norm, by P (note that P is not indexed
by n). Every function in P is continuous; indeed the collection P is
equicontinuous.
The set   B  S  P, when normed by the sum of the three
constituent norms, is a compact metric space. It is immediate that n 
n
B  n
S  P is a closed subset of , and so also compact.
D.2.2 Buyer and Price-Setter Payos
The buyer. The buyer's payo from (b;sB) 2 n
B, when the price-setter
has chosen pU 2 P is
Z
(hB(b();sB())   pU(sB())   cB(b();)) d: (D.5)
Note that the buyer's payo is independent of seller behavior.
For any sB and s, dene
FB(s)  f : sB()  sg
and FS(s)  f : s()  sg:
It suces for this conclusion to show that  is sequentially compact, since sequential
compactness is equivalent to compactness for metric spaces (Dunford and Schwartz, 1988,
p. 20). An argument analogous to that of Helly's theorem (Billingsley, 1986, Theorem







we can choose a subsequence along which each function converges at every rational value




















This ensures convergence at every continuity point of the limit functions, and hence almost




m and everywhere for the functions p
m
U )g, suc-
ing (for bounded functions) for L
1 convergence in the former three cases and convergence
in the sup norm in the latter.Appendix 8
The price-setter. The price-setter's payo from pU 2 P, when the
buyer and seller have chosen (b;sB;s) 2 n
B  n
S is given by
Z  s
0
pU(s)(FB(s)   FS(s)) ds: (D.6)
Hence, the price-setter has an incentive to raise the price of seller attribute
choices in excess demand and lower the price of seller attribute choices in
excess supply.
D.2.3 Seller Payos
The specication of the seller's payo is complicated by the need to incorpo-
rate incentives arising from the possibility of protable seller deviations to










Hence, B(s;p;pU) is the set of buyer attributes that nd attribute s at price
p (weakly) more attractive than any attribute s0 2 [0;  s] at price pU(s0). Note
that since the buyer is constrained in  n to choose seller attributes so that
(D.2) is satised, a maximizing buyer's payo from an attribute b (ignoring
costs) need not be given by maxs02[0; s]fhB(b;s0)   pU(s0)g. Note also that
for all s and pU 2 P, since there is no a priori restriction on p, B(s;p;pU)
is nonempty for low p (possibly requiring p <  P, e.g., if pU   P), and it
is empty if p > pU(s). Indeed, for suciently low p, B(s;p;pU) = [0; b].
Lemma D.1 (1) If B(s;p;pU) 6= ?, then B(s;p;pU) = [b1;b2] with b1  b2.
(2) For xed s and pU, let  p(s;pU)  supfp : B(s;p;pU) 6= ?g and
write [b1(p);b2(p)] for B(s;p;pU) when p   p(s;pU). Denote the set of
discontinuity points in the domain of bj(p) by Dj(s;pU) (j = 1;2). The set
fs : Dj(s;pU) 6= ?g has zero Lebesgue measure.
(3) Suppose f(s`;p`;p`




2]. Then B(s;p;pU) 6= ?, and so B(s;p;pU) = [b1;b2],
where
b1  liminf` b`
1  limsup` b`
2  b2: (D.8)
(4) Moreover,if p 62 Dj(s;pU) [ f p(s;pU)g, then bj = lim` b`
j.Appendix 9
Proof. (1) Suppose b1, b2 2 B(s;p;pU) with b1 < b2, and ^ b 62 B(s;p;pU)
for some ^ b 2 (b1;b2). Then there exists ^ s 2 [0;  s] such that
hB(^ b;s)   p < hB(^ b; ^ s)   pU(^ s):
If ^ s > s, then Assumption 1 implies
hB(b2; ^ s)   hB(b2;s)  hB(^ b; ^ s)   hB(^ b;s)
> pU(^ s)   p;
contradicting b2 2 B(s;p;pU). Similarly, ^ s < s contradicts b1 2 B(s;p;pU),
and so ^ s = s. But b2 2 B(s;p;pU) then implies pU(s)  p while ^ b 62
B(s;p;pU) implies pU(s) < p, the nal contradiction, and so ^ b 2 B(s;p;pU).
It is immediate that B(s;p;pU) is closed.
(2) Since B(s;p0;pU)  B(s;p;pU) for p0 < p, b1(p) and b2(p) are mono-
tonic functions of p, and so are continuous except at a countable number of
points. Moreover, we can apply the maximum theorem (since each of the
functions in the maximum are continuous) to conclude that the right side of
the inequality in (D.7) is continuous in b, and so b1 and b2 are left-continuous
functions of p (as (D.7) features a weak inequality bounding p from above).
Suppose p 2 D1(s;pU), and let b+
1  limp0&p b1(p0). Since b1 is left-
continuous, b1(p) < b+
1 . Then for all b 2 [b1(p);b+
1 ],
hB(b;s)   p = max
s02[0; s]
hB(b;s0)   pU(s0): (D.9)
From the envelope theorem (Milgrom and Segal, 2002, Theorem 2), this








where s0(b) 2 argmaxs02[0; s] hB(b;s0)   pU(s0). Assumption 1 then implies
s = s0(b) for all b 2 (b1(p);b+
1 ), and so p = pU(s).
Since b+
1 2 B(s;pU(s);pU), for all s00 > s,
hB(b+
1 ;s00)   hB(b+










On the other hand, for all s0 < s,

















the price function pU cannot be dierentiable at s. Finally, since pU is a
monotonic function, it is dierentiable almost everywhere (Billingsley, 1986,
Theorem 31.2), and hence fs : D1(s;pU) 6= ?g has zero Lebesgue measure.
A similar argument shows that fs : D2(s;pU) 6= ?g has zero Lebesgue
measure.
(3) Suppose f(s`;p`;p`
U)g` is a sequence converging to (s;p;pU), and let
fb`g be a sequence of attributes with b` 2 B(s`;p`;p`
U) for all `. By taking a
subsequence if necessary, we can assume fb`g is a convergent sequence with
limit b. Since





hB(b;s)   p  max
s02[0; s]
fhB(b;s0)   pU(s0)g;
and so b 2 B(s;p;pU). Hence, from part 2 of the lemma, B(s;p;pU) =
[b1;b2], and (D.8) the follows from taking sequences fb`g with limits liminf` b`
1
and  limsup` b`
2.
(4) Consider b2 and suppose p 62 D2(s;pU) [ f p(s;pU)g (and so p <
 p(s;pU)). Hence, b2 = b+
2  limp0&p b2(p0). Consider b 2 (b+
1 ;b2). For p0 > p
suciently close to p, we have b 2 B(s;p0;pU), and so
hB(b;s)   p > max
s02[0; s]
fhB(b;s0)   pU(s0)g:
Consequently, for ` suciently large,
hB(b;s`)   p` > max
s02[0; s]
fhB(b;s0)   pU(s0)g;
i.e., b 2 B(s`;p`;p`
U). This implies that b`
2(p`)  b, and hence liminf b`
2(p`) 
b. Since this holds for all b 2 (b+
1 ;b2) and limsup` b`
2  b2, we have lim` b`
2 =
b2. The argument for b1 is an obvious modication of this argument.Appendix 11
Fix (s;p;pU) and suppose (f : b() 2 B(s;p;pU)g) > 0. Since b
is strictly increasing and continuous, it then follows from Lemma D.1 that
b([0;1]) \ B(s;p;pU) = [b0
1;b0
2] for some 0  b0
1 < b0
2   b. The payo to the
seller from (s;p;b;pU) is given by
H(s;p;b;pU)  hS(b0
1;s) + p: (D.10)
This function depends upon pU and b through the dependence of b0
1 on
B(s;p;pU) and b. For later reference, note that for xed s, b, and pU,
the function H(s;p;b;pU) is continuous from the left in p (since b satises
(D.1) and both b1(p) and b2(p), dened just before Lemma D.1, are left-
continuous).
We set
~ P(s;b;pU)  fp : (f : b() 2 B(s;p;pU)g) > 0g;
and noting that this set is nonempty, dene
 H(s;b;pU)  max
n




Notice that if p 2 ~ P(s;b;pU) for all p < pU(s), then the rst term in (D.11)
will be the maximum.y
The seller's payo from s 2 n
S when the buyer and price-setter have
chosen (b;sB;pU) 2 n
B  P is then
Z    H(s();b;pU)   cS(s();)

d: (D.12)
Taking the maximum over supp2 ~ P(s;b;pU)H(s;p;b;pU) and hS(0;s) + pU(s)
eectively assumes that the seller can always sell attribute choice s at the
posted price pU(s), though perhaps only attracting buyer attribute choice
0.
Note that the seller, when considering the payo implications of alter-
ing the attribute-choice function over an interval of seller types, can ignore
the seller types outside the interval, since feasibility of buyer responses is
irrelevant (the comparison in B for buyer attributes is always to her payos,
which is independent of seller behavior).
yIt need not be true that for s 2 sB([0;1]), p 2 ~ P(s;b;pU) for all p < pU(s). Moreover,
we may have  H(s;b;pU) 6= hS(b(s
 1
B (s));s)+pU(s) (see the discussion just before Lemma
D.1).Appendix 12
D.3 Equilibrium in game  n
Our next task is to show that each game  n has a Nash equilibrium, and that
the price-setter plays a pure strategy in any such equilibrium. To do this,
we rst note that the price-setter's payo is concave in pU (note that the
buyer's and sellers's payos need not be even quasiconcave). If the payo
functions in game  n are continuous, then Glicksberg's xed point theorem,
applied to the game where we allow the buyer and seller to randomize, yields
a Nash equilibrium in which the buyer and seller may randomize, but the
price-setter does not.
Lemma D.2 The buyer, price-setter and seller payo functions given by
(D.5),(D.6) and (D.12), are continuous functions of (b;sB;s;pU) on n.
Proof. We rst note that for increasing, bounded functions on a compact
set, L1 convergence implies convergence almost everywhere.z
Consider rst the buyer. The functions b, sB, and pU are bounded
functions on compact sets, and hence the absolute value of each of these
functions is dominated by an integrable function. The continuity of the
buyer's payo then follows immediately from Lebesgue's dominated conver-
gence theorem, if we can show that the convergence of b, pU, and sB in
the L1 norm (and hence almost everywhere) implies the convergence almost
everywhere of hB(b;sB), pU(sB), and cB(b();) (note that we are talking
about sequences of functions within a given game  n). The rst and the
third of these follows from the continuity of hB and cB (from Assumptions
1 and 3), while for the remaining case it suces to note that the collection
P is equicontinuous.
Consider now the price-setter. Suppose s` converges in L1, and so almost
everywhere, to s. Then F`
S converges weakly to FS (and so a.e.).x Similarly,
zSuppose ffngn, with each fn increasing, converges in L
1 norm to an increasing func-
tion f without converging almost everywhere. Then since f is discontinuous on a set of
measure zero, there exists (for example) a continuity point x of f with limsupfn(x) > f(x)
(with the case liminf fn(x) < f(x) analogous). The continuity of f at x then ensures
that for some point y > x, some " > 0, all z 2 [x;y] and for innitely many n, we have
fn(z)  fn(x)  f(y)+"  f(z)+". This in turn ensures that
R
jfn(z) f(z)jdz > (y x)"
innitely often, precluding the L
1 convergence of ffng
1
n=1 to f.
xFix " > 0. By Egoro's theorem (Royden, 1988, p.73), s
` converges uniformly to s
on a set E of measure at least 1   ". Suppose s is a continuity point of FS. There then
exists  > 0 such that jFS(s)   FS(s
0)j < " for all js   s
0j  . There exists `
0 such that,
for all  2 E, for all ` > `
0, js
`()   s()j < . Consequently, F
`
S(s) = f : s
`()  sg 
f : s()   sg+" = FS(s+)+" and FS(s ) "  F
`





S converges weakly to FS.Appendix 13
if s`
B converges in L1 to sB, then F`
B converges a.e. to FB. Continuity for the
price-setter's payo then follows from arguments analogous to those applied
to the buyer, since we have convergence almost everywhere of pU[FB  FS].
Finally, we turn to the seller, where the proof of continuity is more
involved. It suces to argue that  H(s;b;pU) is continuous in (s;b;pU)
for almost all s (since sB is irrelevant in the determination of the seller's
payo and the continuity with respect to s is then obvious, at which point
another appeal to Lebesgue's dominated convergence theorem completes the
argument).
Fix a sequence (s`;b`;p`
U) converging to some point (^ s; ^ b; ^ pU). Since we
need continuity for only almost all s 2 [0;  s], we can assume D1(^ s; ^ pU) [
D2(^ s; ^ pU) = ? (or, equivalently, that ^ pU is dierentiable at ^ s, see the proof
of Lemma D.1.2). We thus need only prove the following claim.
Claim 1 lim`!1  H(s`;b`;p`
U) =  H(^ s; ^ b; ^ pU).







p2 ~ P(^ s;^ b;^ pU)




U(s`) = hS(0; ^ s) + ^ pU(^ s):
The second is immediate from the continuity of hS and ^ pU at ^ s.
We accordingly turn to the rst. To conserve on notation, we dene
supp2 ~ P(s;b;pU) H(s;p;b;pU)    H(s;b;pU).




U)    H(^ s; ^ b; ^ pU): (D.13)
For all " > 0 there exists ^ p 2 ~ P(^ s; ^ b; ^ pU) such that
H(^ s; ^ p;^ b; ^ pU) + "=2    H(^ s; ^ b; ^ pU):
Since H(^ s;p; ^ b; ^ pU) is continuous from the left in p, there exists ^ p0 62 D1(^ s; ^ pU)[
D2(^ s; ^ pU) [ f p(^ s; ^ pU)g with ^ p0  ^ p satisfying
jH(^ s; ^ p;^ b; ^ pU)   H(^ s; ^ p0;^ b; ^ pU)j < "=2;
and so
H(^ s; ^ p0;^ b; ^ pU) + "    H(^ s; ^ b; ^ pU):Appendix 14











U) + "    H(^ s; ^ b; ^ pU); 8" > 0;
yielding (D.13).
We now argue that




which with (D.13) gives continuity.
Fix " > 0. For each `, there exists p` 2 ~ P(s`;b`;p`
U) such that
H(s`;p`;b`;p`
U) + "    H(s`;b`;p`
U): (D.15)
Without loss of generality, we can assume fp`g` is a convergent sequence,
with limit ^ p. Suppose rst that ^ p 2 ~ P(^ s; ^ b; ^ pU). If ^ p 6= f p(^ s; ^ pU)g, it is
immediate that




which (since it holds for all ") implies (D.14).
Suppose now that ^ p 62 ~ P(^ s; ^ b; ^ pU) or p =  p(^ s; ^ pU). Since ^ pU is dier-
entiable at ^ s, there cannot be a nondegenerate interval of buyer attributes
indierent between (^ s; ^ p) and the unconstrained optimal seller attribute un-
der ^ pU. This implies ^ b([0;1]) \ B(^ s; ^ p; ^ pU) = f^ bg for some ^ b, and so





U) + " = hS(^ b; ^ s) + ^ p + ";
and so (taking the limsup of both sides of (D.15))




which (since it holds for all " > 0) implies (D.14).Appendix 15
Allowing the buyer and seller to choose mixed strategies then gives us
a game whose best responses consist of closed, convex sets. As a result, we
can apply Glicksberg (1952) to conclude that we have a Nash equilibrium in
which the price-setter plays a pure strategy, while the buyer and seller may
mix:





D.4 The limit n ! 1




(B)  (S)  P be a sequence of Nash equilibria of the games  n.
Without loss of generality (since the relevant spaces are sequentially com-




U), and that players' payos also converge.
We examine the limit (
B;
S;p
U). Intuitively, we would like to think of
this prole as the equilibrium of a \limit game." However, the denition
of this limit game is not straightforward, since the denition of the seller's
payos in the game  n relies on the strategies b, sB, and s having properties
(such as strict monotonicity and continuity) that need not carry over to their
limits. In establishing properties of (
B;
S;p
U), we accordingly typically




U) to obtain a contradiction. The latter step of
the argument is notationally cumbersome, and we do not always make the
approximation explicit.
Note that while the seller is best responding to n
B in choosing s, the
choice of p implicit in (D.11) is made after (b;sB) is realized.
While the L1 topology does not distinguish between functions that agree
almost everywhere, it will be important for some of the later developments
that we make the selection indicated in the next lemma from the equivalence
classes of functions that agree almost everywhere.
Lemma D.4 The limit prole (
B;
S;p
U) is pure, which we denote by
(b;s
B;s;p
U). The limit functions can be (and subsequently are) taken
to be increasing, and the functions b, s
B, and s can be (and subsequently
are) taken to be continuous from the left.
Proof. Consider the buyer (the case of the seller is analogous). Toward a
contradiction, suppose the buyer's strategy (
B;
S) is not pure. Let 
B;b and

B;s denote the marginal distributions induced on buyer and seller attributesAppendix 16
chosen by the buyer. Then dene a pair of increasing functions b0 : [0;1] !
[0; b] and s0
B : [0;1] ! [0;  s] by
b0() = inffb : 
B;b(b)  g
and s0
B() = inffs : 
B;s(s)  g:
These functions constitute pure strategies for the buyer giving the same
distribution of buyer and seller attributes chosen by the buyer. (For exam-
ple, for any set [b;b] of buyer attributes with b > 0, 
B;b[b;b] = 00   0,
where b0(00) = b and b0(0) = b.) However, the b0 and s0
B feature positive
assortativity between the buyer's types and attribute choice, and between
the buyer's and the seller's attribute with which the buyer matches, while

B;b and 
B;s, being mixed, do not. From Assumptions 1 and 3, this posi-
tive assortativity increases the buyer's payo, and so the constructed pure
strategy strictly increases the buyer's payo. It then follows from straight-
forward continuity arguments that for suciently large n, i.e., for a game in
which the slope requirements on the buyer's strategy are suciently weak
and the equilibrium prole (n
B;n
S;pn




there is a pure strategy suciently close to b0 and s0
B giving the buyer a
payo higher than his supposed equilibrium payo in  n a contradiction.
Hence, the buyer cannot mix.
The conclusion that each function is increasing is an implication of the
observation that if a sequence of increasing functions ffng converges in L1
to a function f, then that function is increasing.
It is helpful to keep in mind the nature of convergence in (B) 
(S)  P. Recalling that B, S, are each endowed with the L1 norm
and P with the sup norm, and the denition of the Prohorov metric
(which metrizes weak convergence), (n
B;n
S;pn
U) converges to the pure pro-
le (b;s
B;s;p
U) if, and only if, the following holds: For all " > 0 there



















js()   s()jd < "
	





We next restate the nature of convergence in a more useful form:Appendix 17
Lemma D.5 For all " > 0, there exists a set E"  [0;1] with (E")  1 "
and n" such that for all n  n",
n
B (f(b;sB) 2 n
B : jb()   b()j < "; jsB()   s
B()j < "; 8 2 E"g)
 1   ";
n
S (fs 2 n




U(s)j < "; 8s:
Moreover, the sets E" are nested: E"0
 E" if " < "0.
Proof. Fix " > 0. We prove that there is a set E"
S with (E"
S) > 1   "=3
and an integer n0
S such that
n
S (fs 2 n
S : js()   s()j < "; 8 2 E"
Sg)  1   " (D.17)
for all n > n0
S. The same argument implies a set E"
B and integer n0
B for
the function b, and a ^ E"
B and n00
B for the function s
B.{ The desired set is
E" = E"
S \ E"
B \ ^ E"




Let fkg be an enumeration of the discontinuities of s. Since s is
bounded, there exists K such that the total size of the discontinuities over
fkgk>K is less than "=6.
Fix L > 2 such that f(k  2 kL;k +2 kL)gK
k=1 is pairwise disjoint and
21 L < "=6. Dening
E"
S = [0;1] n
[
k
(k   2 kL;k + 2 kL)
yields a set of measure at least 1   "=3.
Let EK
S be the set given by [0;1] n [K
k=1(k   2 kL;k + 2 kL); clearly
E"
S  EK
S . The set EK
S can be written as the disjoint union of closed intervals







B : jb()   b
()j < "; 8 2 E
"
Bg)  1   "=2;







B : jsB()   s

B()j < "; 8 2 ^ E
"
Bg)  1   "=2;









B : jb()   b
()j < ";jsB()   s

B()j < "; 8 2 E
"
B \ ^ E
"
Bg)  1   ":Appendix 18
Ik, k = 0;1;:::;K. There exists an  > 0 such that for all k and for all
;0 2 Ik, if j   0j <  then js()   s(0)j < "/3.
Let fx`g  Ik be an -grid of Ik, i.e., x`+1    < x` < x`+1 for all `.
Consider an increasing function s satisfying
R
js sj < "/3. We claim
that for all  2 EK
S (and so for all  2 E"
S), js sj < ". Observe that (D.17)
then follows, since n0






js   sj < "=3
	

1   " holds for all n > n0
S.
The claim follows from two observations:
1. js(x`)   s(x`)j < 2"=3: Suppose s(x`)  s(x`) + 2"=3 (the other
possibility is handled mutatis mutandis). Then, for all  2 (x`;x`+1),
s()  s(x`)  s(x`) + 2"=3 > s() + "=3:
But this is impossible, since it would imply
R
js   sj > "=3.
2. For all ` and all  2 (x`;x`+1), js()   s()j < ": Suppose s() 
s() + " (the other possibility is handled mutatis mutandis). Then,
s(x`+1)  s()  s() + "  s(x`+1) + 2"=3;
contradicting the previous observation.
The last assertion of Lemma D.5 is immediate from the denition of E"
S.
Lemma D.6 The prole (b;s
B;s;p
U) balances the market, i.e., F
B(s) =
F
S(s) for all s. Hence, s
B(x) = s(x) for almost all x 2 [0;1].
Proof. Since F
B and F
S are continuous from the right, it suces to show
that they agree almost everywhere. We rst argue that F
B(s)   F
S(s)  0
almost everywhere. Suppose this is not the case, so there exists ^ s <  s with
F
B(^ s)   F
S(^ s) = " > 0 and with ^ s a continuity point of F
B   F
S. Then
there exists s1 and s2 with ^ s 2 (s1;s2), F
B(s)   F
S(s)  "=2 on [s1;s2],
and either s1 = 0 or, for every  > 0, there is a value s 2 [s1   ;s1) with
F
B(s)   F
S(s) < "=2 (note that F
B(s)   F
S(s) may be negative, and
so is bounded below by  1). We consider the case in which s1 > 0 and
p
U(s1) < p
U(s2), with the remaining cases a straightforward simplication.
Since F
B(s)   F
S(s) > 0 on [s1;s2], for xed p
U(s1) and p
U(s2), the
price-setter must be setting prices as large as possible on this interval. If
not, there is a price function ^ pU 2 P with ^ pU(s)  p
U(s) for all s andAppendix 19
^ pU(s) > p
U(s) for some s yielding strictly higher payos to the price-setter
than p
U in  n for suciently large n, when the buyer and seller choose
(n
B;n




Hence, there exists s0 2 [s1;s2] such that dp
U(s)=ds = 2 on (s1;s0) and
p
U(s) = p
U(s2) for s 2 [s0;s2]. That is, prices increase at the maximum
rate possible until hitting p
U(s2) (with s0 = s2 possible, but since p
U(s1) <
p
U(s2), we have s1 < s0). Consequently, sB([0;1]) \ [s1;s2]  fs1;s2g, i.e.,
buyers demand only seller attribute choices s1 and s2 from this interval.
(Since all seller attribute choices in [s0;s2] command the same price, buyers
demand only attribute choice s2 from this set, while the price of a seller
attribute choice increases suciently quickly on [s1;s0] that from this set
buyers demand only s1.)
Since for every  > 0, there exists s 2 [s1 ;s1) with F
B(s) F
S(s) <
"=2 and yet F
B(s1) F
S(s1)  ", the buyer must choose attributes arbitrarily
close to s1 for some buyer types. This implies that there is a range of seller
attributes just below s1 with prices that are not too low, that is, there exists
0 > 0 such that
p
U(s) > p
U(s1)   (s1   s)
for all s 2 [s1   0;s1). Consider now the price function p









U(s); if s  s0,
minfp
U(s1   ) + 2(s   s1 + ); p
U(s0)g; if s 2 (s1   ;s0),
p
U(s); if s  s1   ,





U, the price-setter's payo from
choosing p

U 2 P less the payo from p

























U(s1   ) + 2(s   s1 + )   p
U(s1) + (s1   s)
= p
U(s1   )   p
U(s1)   (s1   s) + 2
 2:









U(s1   ) + 2(s   s1 + )   p
U(s)
 p
U(s1)    + 2(s   s1 + )   p
U(s)
= p
U(s1)    + 2(s   s1 + )   p













which is clearly positive for suciently small . Since the lower bound is
strictly positive, the price-setter has a protable deviation (in  n for large
n), a contradiction.
We conclude that F
B(s)   F
S(s)  0 for almost all s. It remains to
argue that it is not negative on a set of positive measure. Suppose it is.
Then there must exist a seller characteristic ^ s > 0 such that pU(s) =  P
for s < ^ s, F
B(s)   F
S(s) < 0 for a positive-measure subset of [0; ^ s], and
F
B(s)   F
S(s) = 0 for almost all s > ^ s. But then no seller would choose
attributes in [0; ^ s), a contradiction.
We now seek a characterization of the seller's payos. Intuitively, we
would like to use Lemma D.6 and the monotonicity of b and s
B to conclude
that there is positive assortative matching, and indeed that a seller of type
 matches with a buyer of type  = . However, these properties may not
hold if b and s
B are not strictly increasing. Moreover, even if we had such
a matching, the specication of the seller's payos given by (D.12) leaves
open the possibility that the (gross) payo to a seller of type  choosing
attribute s may not be given by hS(~ b(s);s)+pU(s). Hence, the buyers that
sellers are implicitly choosing in their payo calculations may not duplicate
those whose seller choices balance the market.
Our rst step in addressing these issues is to show that the buyer's
limiting attribute-choice function is indeed strictly increasing. Intuitively, if
a positive measure of buyer types choose the same attribute, by having some
higher types in the pool choose a slightly higher attribute, and some lower
types choose a slightly lower attribute, we can keep the average attribute
unchanged, while saving costs (from Assumption 3).
Lemma D.7 The function b is strictly increasing when nonzero.Appendix 21
Proof. By construction, b is weakly increasing. We show that 00 > 0
and b(0) > 0 imply b(00) > b(0). Suppose to the contrary that b =
b() > 0 for two distinct values of .
Dene 1  inff : b() = bg, 2  supf : b() = bg, and   =
(1 +2)=2. We assume 0 < 1 and 2 < 1 (if equality holds in either case,
then the argument is modied in the obvious manner). We now dene a
new attribute-choice function (as a function of a parameter  > 0) that is
strictly increasing on a neighborhood of [1;2] and agrees with b outside
that neighborhood. First, dene


1 =inff  1 : b()  b + (    )g
and 

2 =supf  2 : b()  b + (    )g:
Note that as  ! 0, 






b(); if  > 

2;





b(); if  < 

1:




























@cB(b;   + x)
@b
 




From Assumption 3, the integrand is strictly negative, and so the integral
is strictly negative and independent of . Since s
B is increasing, a similar










@cB(b;     x)
@b
 
@cB(b;   + x)
@b

xd + o():Appendix 22





2] is of order o(). But this is immediate, since jb() b()j  
and 

j ! j as  ! 0 (for j = 1;2). Hence, for  > 0 suciently small,
b gives the buyer a strictly higher payo under (D.5) than b. But, then
by a now familiar argument, the buyer has a protable deviation in  n
for suciently large n, a contradiction. So b is strictly increasing when
nonzero.
We next show that the seller's payos converge to the payo one would
expect the seller to receive by matching with his corresponding buyer type.






= hS(b());s()) + p
U(s())   cS(s();):
The functions s and b on the left side of this expression are strategies in the
game  n, and are the objects over which the equilibrium n mixes.
Proof. Suppose the claim is false. Then, since the limit exists, there exists
n00 and  > 0 such that for all  in a set G of sellers of measure at least 
whose \matched" buyers choose positive attributes (i.e., b() > 0), for all
n > n00, Z
 H(s();b;pn
U)   cS(s();)dn
is at least  distant from
hS(b();s()) + p
U(s())   cS(s();):
Since G has positive measure, we may assume that every index in G is
a continuity point of the limit functions (b;s
B;s).
For any " > 0, let E"  [0;1] be the set from Lemma D.5 satisfying
(E")  1   ".
Fix an index 0 2 G \ E"0
for some "0 > 0 (since E" is monotonic in ",
0 2 G \ E" for all smaller "). Since b is strictly increasing, without loss
of generality, we may assume that, for all  > 0, there is a positive measure
set of buyers with b() 2 (b(0)   ;b(0)). Indeed, a positive measure
set of buyers in E" does so for all " suciently small. Formally,
8 > 0 9"00 8" < "00; f 2 E" : b() 2 (b(0)   ;b(0))g > 0: (D.20)Appendix 23
Consider some " < "0 and suppose n > maxfn";n00g, where n" is from
Lemma D.5. Let (b;sB;s) 2 n
B  n
S be a triple of functions with the
property that jb()   b()j < " and jsB()   s
B()j < " for all  2 E",
and js()   s()j < " for all  2 E". (Recall that, from Lemma D.5, n
assigns high probability to such functions for large n.)
By Lemma D.6, s and s
B are equal almost surely, so without loss of
generality, we may assume that s(x) = s
B(x) for all x 2 E.




U)   cS(s();) = hS(0;s()) + pn
U(s())   cS(s();)
 hS(b();s()) + pn
U(s())   cS(s();):
We claim that, for suciently small " > 0, the set ~ P(s();b;pn
U) contains
all p < pn
U(s()). This follows from (D.20) and the observation that buyers
in E" receive a payo (ignoring costs) arbitrarily close to hB(b();s()) 
p
U(s()):
Consequently, for p suciently close to pn
U(s()), single crossing (As-
sumption 1) implies that a buyer  with attribute satisfying b() < b()





U) = hS(b();s()) + pn
U(s()):
By choosing " small (or, equivalently, n large), the right side can be made
arbitrarily close to
hS(b1(s0);s0) + p
U(s0) = hS(b1(s());s()) + p
U(s()):
Hence, the max in (D.11) is achieved by the rst term, and we have a
contradiction.
With this payo characterization in hand, we can show that seller at-
tribute choices are strictly increasing in types (when positive), as are the
types of sellers with whom buyers attempt to match.
Lemma D.9 The functions s
B and s are strictly increasing on f : b() >
0g.
Proof. From Lemma D.6, s
B(x) = s(x) for almost all x 2 [0;1], and so it
suces to prove the result for s. Suppose to the contrary there is a strictly
positive constant ^ s and associated maximal nondegenerate interval (1;2)Appendix 24
with s() = ^ s and b() > 0 for all  2 (1;2). From Lemma D.6, we
also have s
B() = ^ s for all  2 (1;2).
Dene b1  lim#1 b() and b2  lim"2 b().
Dene ()  inff : s()  ^ s + g, and notice that lim!0 () = 2.
The seller attribute-choice function s0 given by
s0(s) =

s(); if  62 (1;());
^ s + ; if  2 (1;());
is weakly increasing. Consider the price ^ p > p
U(^ s) for attribute ^ s + 
satisfying
^ p = supfp : B(^ s + ;p;p
U) 6= ?g:
(This is  p(^ s + ;p;p
U) from Lemma D.1(1).) The price ^ p is at least as high
as the value p0 satisfying hB(b2; ^ s) pU(^ s) = hB(b2; ^ s+) p0. At the price
^ p for attribute choice ^ s + , the seller ensures that attribute choice ^ s + 
is chosen by a buyer at least as high as b2 (the single-crossing condition
on buyer premuneration values ensures that no lower attribute buyers will
choose ^ s + ). From Lemma D.8, we have then have that the switch to
attribute-choice function s0 increases the seller's payo by at least
Z 2
1
(hS(b2; ^ s + ) + ^ p)d  
Z 2
1





(cs(^ s + ;)   cS(s();)d
> (2   1)[hS(b2; ^ s + )   hS(b1; ^ s]
  (()   1)[cS(^ s + ;1)   cS(^ s;1)]:
The rst term after the inequality is bounded away from zero as  approaches
zero, while the second approaches zero as does , ensuring that there is some
 > 0 for which the payo dierence is positive. Intuitively, each seller in
the interval (1;2) experiences a discontinuous increase in expected buyer
(at a higher price) when increasing her attribute choice, while sellers in the
interval (2;()) experience a continuous increase in cost. The attribute-
choice function s0 increases the seller's payo for suciently small , yielding
the result.
The limiting mass of buyers and seller choosing zero attributes are equal:
Lemma D.10
(f : s() = 0g) = (f : b() = 0g):Appendix 25
Proof. First, suppose (f : b() = 0g) > (f : s() = 0g). Then
because s
B = s almost everywhere, there exists a positive mass of buyers
for whom b() = 0 and s
B() > 0. By Assumption 2, hB(0;s) is inde-
pendent of s, and so, since p
U is strictly increasing, the buyers choosing
b = 0 can increase their payo by choosing s = 0. The buyer's equilibrium
strategy must then be suboptimal in the game  n for suciently large n, a
contradiction.
Now, suppose (f : b() = 0g) < (f : s() = 0g). Then there
exists a positive mass of buyers for whom b() > 0 and s
B() = 0. By
Lemma D.6, there is then a positive mass of buyers choosing a zero seller
attribute and positive buyer attribute. Since hB(b;0) is independent of b
(Assumption 2) and cB(b;) is strictly increasing in b, such buyers can in-
crease their payo by choosing b = 0. The buyer's equilibrium strategy must
then be suboptimal in the game  n for suciently large n, a contradiction.




b((s) 1(s)); s 2 s([0;1]);s > 0;




s((b) 1(b)); b 2 b([0;1]);b > 0;
maxf0;sups2Sfs < s(inff : b() > bg)gg; otherwise:
The maximum in the specication of ~ b (with ~ s similar) ensures that ~ b is
well dened when s is continuous at inffjs() > 0g (in which case, the
supremum is taken over the empty set and so has value  1).
Lemma D.11 The pair (~ b; ~ s) is a feasible matching. In addition, for all
values b > 0 and s > 0, we have




inff : b() > bg; for b  b(1),
1; for b > b(1);
and




inff : s() > sg; for s  s(1),
1; for s > s(1):
Proof. From Lemma D.10, we can assume that b and s share a common
set [0;x] on which they are zero. It is then immediate that (~ b; ~ s) is a
feasible matching.
The nal two statements follow immediately from the left continuity of
the attribute-choice functions (see Lemma D.4) and the denitions of ~ s and
~ b.
Finally, we show that the seller's payo satises an optimality condition.










hS(~ b(s);s) + p
U(s)   cS(s;):
Proof. The rst inequality duplicates Lemma D.8.
Single-crossing (Assumption 3) implies that the attribute choices maxi-
mizing hS(~ b(s);s)+p
U(s) cS(s;) are increasing in , and so if the second
equality fails, in games  n for suciently large n, the seller has a protable
deviation.
D.5 Uniform-Price Equilibria
We nally argue that the prole (b;s;~ b; ~ s;p
U) induces a uniform-price
equilibrium of the matching market with identical attribute choices and
matching function (but perhaps a vertical shift in the price function).
The rst task is to show that equilibrium payos are nonnegative, so




is the sequence whose limit induces (b;s
B;~ b; ~ s;p
U). We have
hB(0;0)   p
U(0) = hB(0;0)   p
U(0)   cB(0;)
 hB(b(); ~ s(b()))   p
U(~ s(b()))   cB(b();) (D.21)Appendix 27
and
hS(0;0) + p
U(0) = hS(0;0) + p
U(0)   cS(0;)
 hS(~ b(s());s()) + p
U(s())   cS(s();): (D.22)
Let
  hB(0;0)   p
U(0)   hS(0;0)   p
U(0)
(where the inequality follows from Assumption 2) and replace the price
function p
U with p
U +. Both n
B and n
S remain best responses given price
pn
U +  and markets still clear in the limit of n ! 1. Moreover, replacing
p
U with p
U +  in (D.21){(D.22) gives nonnegative payos.
It is immediate from the formulation of the buyer's payos in the game
and from Lemma D.12 that almost all buyers and sellers are optimizing
given p
U.
It remains to consider deviations by a seller of type  to a value s not
chosen by any seller under s. If there is a protable such deviation for
seller , then there is a price p such that B(s;p;p
U) is nonempty and for all
b 2 B(s;p;p
U),
S(s();) < hS(b;s) + p   cS(s;):
But then for all suciently large n, B(s;p0;pn
U) is again nonempty for p0
less than but close to p, contradicting the fact that S(s();) is close to R  H(s();b;pn
U)   cS(s();)dn.
D.6 Nontriviality
Partial nontriviality. We now show that under (14), the prole (b;s;~ b; ~ s;p
U)
is nontrivial. If the equilibrium is trivial, b and s are identically zero, so
that there is no agent for whom it is protable to trade at price pU, and
hence for all (b;s) 2 (0; b]  (0;  s],
hS(0;s) + pU(s)   cS(s;1)  0
and hB(b;s)   pU(s)   cB(b;1)  0;
where we focus on agents  = 1 =  since they are the most likely to want
to trade. Notice that we are using here the maximum that appears in the
building block (D.11) for the specication of the seller's payo, and which
eectively allows the seller to sell any attribute choice s 2 [0;  s] at priceAppendix 28
pU(s), assuming in the process that he can attract at least a zero-attribute
buyer. For these two inequalities to hold, it must be that
hB(b;s) + hS(0;s)  cB(b;1) + cS(s;1);
contradicting (14).
Full nontriviality. We now assume (15) holds. Suppose that there is
an interval of seller types [0;0] with 0 > 0 who choose zero attributes. By
Lemma D.9, we then have b() = 0 for all  2 [0;0]. If neither agent of
type  2 (0;0) chooses a strictly positive attribute, it must be that
hS(0;s) + pU(s)   cS(s;)  0
and hB(b;s)   pU(s)   cB(b;)  0;
where (b;s) are a pair of attributes satisfying (15). But summing these two
inequalities yields an inequality contradicting (15).
E Personalized Pricing
E.1 Prices
A personalized-price function is a function pP : B  S ! R; where pP(b;s)
is the (possibly negative) price that seller with attribute choice s 2 S re-
ceives when selling to a buyer with attribute choice b 2 B. We emphasize
that a personalized-price function prices only matches between marketed
attributes.
E.2 Equilibrium
Given a feasible outcome (b;s;~ b; ~ s) and a personalized price pP, the payos
to a buyer  who chooses b 2 B and to a seller  who chooses s 2 S are
given by
B(b;)  hB(b; ~ s(b))   pP(b; ~ s(b))   cB(b;)
and S(s;)  hS(~ b(s);s) + pP(~ b(s);s)   cS(s;):
The specication of equilibrium begins with appropriate modications
of the notions of buyer and seller optimization given pU (i.e., (3) and (4)):Appendix 29
Denition E.1 Given a feasible outcome (b;s;~ b; ~ s), buyer  is optimizing
at b given pP if
(b(); ~ s(b())) 2 argmax
(b;s)2BS
hB(b;s)   pP(b;s)   cB(b;): (E.1)
Seller  is optimizing at s given pP if
(~ b(s());s()) 2 argmax
(b;s)2BS
hS(b;s) + pP(b;s)   cS(s;): (E.2)
Since the personalized-price function pP prices only pairs of marketed
attributes, the stipulation that a seller optimize given pP says nothing about
what might happen if this seller chooses an attribute s 62 S. We require that
no seller can choose an attribute s 62 S, nd a target buyer attribute b 2 B
with whom to match, and nd a way to split the resulting surplus so that
the seller and target buyer are both better o than in equilibrium:k
Denition E.2 Given (b;s;~ b; ~ s;pP), there is a protable seller deviation
if there exists a seller  such that either (i) S(s();) < 0 or (ii) there
exist an unmarketed seller attribute choice s 62 S, a marketed buyer attribute
b 2 B, and a price p 2 R such that
hB(b; ~ s(b))   pP(b; ~ s(b)) < hB(b;s)   p (E.3)
and S(s();) < hS(b;s) + p   cS(s;): (E.4)
The denition of a buyer's protable deviation is similar:
Denition E.3 Given (b;s;~ b; ~ s;pP), there is a protable buyer deviation
if there exists a buyer  such that either (i) B(b();) < 0 or (ii) there
exist an unmarketed buyer attribute choice b 62 B, a marketed seller attribute
s 2 S, and a price p 2 R such that
B(b();) < hB(b;s)   p   cB(b;)
and hS(~ b(s);s) + pP(~ b(s);s) < hS(b;s) + p:
Denition E.4 A feasible outcome (b;s;~ b; ~ s) and a personalized-price func-
tion pP constitute a personalized-price equilibrium if all buyers and sellers
are optimizing given pP and no buyer or seller has a protable deviation.
kSimilar to footnote 6, Denitions E.2 and E.3 can be extended to cover deviations to
any seller attribute, as well as to prices that dier from the personalized-price function.
See Mailath, Postlewaite, and Samuelson (2010) for details.Appendix 30
Remark E.1 (Premuneration Values) Since personalized prices can com-
pensate for any alterations of the division of v(b;s), the decomposition
of the surplus v(b;s) between the buyer's and seller's premuneration val-
ues plays no role in the eciency of a personalized-price equilibrium out-
come. In particular, it is a straightforward calculation that if (b;s;~ b; ~ s;pP)
is a personalized-price equilibrium with premuneration values hB(b;s) and
hS(b;s), then (b;s;~ b; ~ s;p0





P(b;s) = pP(b;s) + h0
B(b;s)   hB(b;s) = pP(b;s) + hS(b;s)   h0
S(b;s):

Remark E.2 (Ex Post Contracting Equilibrium) Cole, Mailath, and
Postlewaite (2001) study continua of buyers and sellers who rst simultane-
ously choose attributes (as here), and then match and bargain to divide the
resulting surplus v(b;s), with the matching/bargaining stage being modeled
as a cooperative game (more specically, an assignment game). An ex post
contracting equilibrium in Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001) is a Nash
equilibrium of the noncooperative attribute-choice game, where the payos
from the attribute choices are determined by stable (equivalently, core) allo-
cations in the induced assignment game. The set of outcomes and implied
payos are essentially the same under the two notions (modulo some techni-
cal dierences). In particular, if all buyers and sellers are optimizing in the
market given pP, then no buyer-seller pair with attributes (b;s) 2 BS can
block the equilibrium. Moreover, a seller  has a protable out-of-market
deviation if and only if there is a blocking pair consisting of that seller (with
some attribute s) and some buyer with an attribute b 2 B. An analogous
comment applies to buyers. 
E.3 Eciency
Lemma E.1 In any personalized-price equilibrium (b;s;~ b; ~ s;pP), ~ b and ~ s
are strictly increasing for strictly positive attributes.
Proof. We consider only ~ b (since ~ s is almost identical). Suppose ~ b is not
strictly increasing. Since ~ b is one-to-one on s((;1]) (see Denition 1 and its
Consequently, matching is over buyers and sellers, not attributes as here. This dier-
ence results in some technical complications.Appendix 31
following comment), there exists 0 < s1 < s2 with b1  ~ b(s1) > ~ b(s2)  b2.
From (E.1) for the buyer choosing b1 and from (E.2) for the seller choosing
s2, we have
hB(b1;s1)   pP(b1;s1)  hB(b1;s2)   pP(b1;s2)
and hS(b2;s2) + pP(b2;s2)  hS(b1;s2) + pP(b1;s2);
and so
hB(b1;s1) + hS(b2;s2)   pP(b1;s1) + pP(b2;s2)  v(b1;s2):
Adding this to the analogous inequality obtained from (E.1) for the buyer
choosing b2 and from (E.2) for the seller choosing s1, we obtain
v(b1;s1) + v(b2;s2)  v(b1;s2) + v(b2;s1):
But Assumption 1 requires the reverse (strict) inequality, a contradiction.
From Lemma E.1, matching in a personalized-price equilibrium is pos-
itively assortative in attributes. Since the attribute-choice functions are
strictly increasing in index when positive, we can accordingly dene the ex
ante surplus for buyer and seller types  =  =  2 [0;1] as
W(b;s;)  hB(b;s) + hS(b;s)   cB(b;)   cS(s;)
= v(b;s)   cB(b;)   cS(s;):
An ecient choice of attributes maximizes W(b;s;) for (almost) all .
Personalized-price equilibrium outcomes are constrained ecient in the
sense that no matched pair of agents can increase its net surplus without
both agents deviating to attribute choices outside the sets of marketed at-
tributes B and S:yy
Lemma E.2 Suppose (b;s;~ b; ~ s;pP) is a personalized-price equilibrium. Then,
for all  2 [0;1], b 2 B; s 2 S and all b0 and s0,
W(b;s0;)  W(b();s();)
and W(b0;s;)  W(b();s();):
yyThis is essentially Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001, Lemma 2), which describes
a constrained eciency property of ex post contracting equilibria (see Remark E.2). The
current formulation allows a more transparent statement and proof.Appendix 32
Proof. En route to a contradiction, suppose there exists  2 [0;1], b 2 B
and s0 2 [0;  s] such that W(b;s0;) > W(b();s();). The other possibility
is handled analogously.
Let " = [W(b;s0;)   W(b();s();)]=3 > 0 and set p = hB(b;s0)  
hB(b; ~ s(b)) + pP(b; ~ s(b))   ". The seller of type  =  can induce a buyer
with attribute choice b to buy from him by choosing s0 and oering a price
p. Moreover, this deviation is strictly preferred by the seller :
hS(b;s0) + p   cS(s0;)
= hS(b;s0) + hB(b;s0)   hB(b; ~ s(b)) + pP(b; ~ s(b))   "   cS(s0;)
> S(s();) + [hB(b();s())   pP(b();s())   cB(b();)]
  [hB(b; ~ s(b))   pP(b; ~ s(b))   cB(b;)] + "
 S(s();) + ";
where the equality uses the denition of p, the strict inequality follows from
W(b;s0;) > W(b();s();)+2", and the last inequality is an implication
of (E.1).
Lemma E.2 does not ensure that a personalized-price equilibrium out-
come is ecient. The possibility remains that W(b;s;) may be maximized
by a pair of values b 62 B and s 62 S. In this sense, the ineciency is the
result of a coordination failure. For example, for the premuneration values
hB(b;s) = bs and hS(b;s) = (1   )bs, it is an equilibrium for all agents
to choose attribute 0, giving a constrained-ecient outcome that is in fact
quite inecient. The possible ineciency of a uniform-price equilibrium can
be viewed as reecting incomplete markets.
We could ensure eciency by ensuring that a price exists for every at-
tribute combination, whether marketed or not:
Denition E.5 The feasible outcome (b;s;~ b; ~ s) and personalized price pP
is a complete personalized-price equilibrium if there is an extension of pP
to [0; b]  [0;  s] (also denoted by pP) such that for all  and all ,
0  B(b();) = sup
(b;s)2[0; b][0; s]
hB(b;s)   pP(b;s)   cB(b;)
and 0  S(s();) = sup
(b;s)2[0; b][0; s]
hS(b;s) + pP(b;s)   cS(s;):
Though the names suggest that every complete personalized-price equi-
librium outcome is indeed a personalized-price equilibrium outcome, this is
not immediate, as we have replaced the prohibition on protable deviationsAppendix 33
with the requirement that agents be optimizing given pP with respect to all
attribute choices. However, we have:
Lemma E.3
(E.3.1) Every complete personalized-price equilibrium outcome is a personalized-
price equilibrium outcome.
(E.3.2) A complete personalized-price equilibrium outcome is ecient.
Proof. Fix a complete personalized-price equilibrium (b;s;~ b; ~ s;pP). To
show that this is a personalized-price equilibrium, we must show there are
no protable deviations. We discuss seller deviations; the buyer case is
analogous. Suppose the seller has a protable deviation, so there exists a
type  and an attribute choice s0 = 2 S, a price p 2 R, and b0 2 B with
S(s();) < hS(b0;s0) + p   cS(s0;) (E.5)
and
hB(b0; ~ s(b0))   pP(b0; ~ s(b0)) < hB(b0;s0)   p: (E.6)
Since (b;s;~ b; ~ s;pP) is a complete personalized-price equilibrium, (E.5) im-
plies p > pP(b0;s0).
There exists some  2 [0;1] for which b0 = b(), and so subtracting
cB(b0;) from both sides of (E.6) and again using the assumption that
(b;s;~ b; ~ s;pP) is a complete personalized-price equilibrium gives p < pP(b0;s0),
a contradiction.
Since every pair of attributes is priced, the eciency of complete personalized-
price equilibria is a straightforward calculation.
One route to existence is to note that a personalized-price equilibrium
is essentially equivalent to Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001) ex post
contracting equilibrium, and then to refer to that paper for conditions for the
existence of an ex post contracting equilibria. We take an alternative route
here, building on the relationship between personalized-price and uniform-
price equilibria.
Proposition E.1 There exists an ecient personalized-price equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose rst that hS(b;s) = 0 and hence hB(b;s) = v(b;s) for all
pairs (b;s). Proposition 3 ensures that there exists a complete uniform-priceAppendix 34
equilibrium. Since hS(b;s) = 0, this is also a complete personalized-price
equilibrium. Then, if hS(b;s) 6= 0, by setting
p0
P(b;s) = pP(b;s)   hS(b;s) = pP(b;s) + hB(b;s)   v(b;s);
we again have a complete (and hence ecient) personalized-price equilib-
rium.
E.4 Uniform Rationing Equilibria
Lemma E.4 Any personalized-price equilibrium outcome is a uniform-rationing
equilibrium outcome.
Proof. Let (b;s;~ b; ~ s) be a personalized-price equilibrium outcome and con-
sider its associated uniform-rationing price. The conditions for the latter
to be a personalized-price equilibrium are implied by the former, with the
exception that there may now be protable deviations by a buyer  with
attribute choice b() to match with a seller with s < ~ s(b()) (and hence
~ b(s) < b()). But since hS(b;s) is increasing in b, the seller in question
would welcome such a match. Hence, if this match is a protable devia-
tion in the uniform-rationing equilibrium, it is a protable deviation in the
personalized-price equilibrium, a contradiction.
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